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Abstract—Determining a single-letter secrecy-capacity formula
for the arbitrarily varying wiretap channel (AVWTC) is an open
problem largely because of two main challenges. Not only does it
capture the difficulty of the compound wiretap channel (another
open problem), it also requires that secrecy is ensured with
respect to exponentially many possible channel state sequences.
By extending the strong soft-covering lemma, recently derived by
the authors, to the heterogeneous scenario, this work accounts
for the exponential number of secrecy constraints while only
imposing single-letter constraints on the communication rate.
Through this approach we derive a single-letter characterization
of the correlated-random (CR) assisted semantic-security (SS)
capacity of an AVWTC with a type constraint on the allowed
state sequences. The allowed state sequences are the ones in a
typical set around a single constraining type. The stringent SS
requirement is established by showing that the mutual informa-
tion between the message and the eavesdropper’s observations is
negligible even when maximized over all message distributions,
choices of state sequences and realizations of the CR-code.
Both the achievability and the converse proofs of the type
constrained coding theorem rely on stronger claims than actually
required. The direct part establishes a novel single-letter lower
bound on the CR-assisted SS-capacity of an AVWTC with state
sequences constrained by any convex and closed set of state
probability mass functions. This bound achieves the best known
single-letter secrecy rates for a corresponding compound wiretap
channel over the same constraint set. In contrast to other single-
letter results in the AVWTC literature, this work does not
assume the existence of a best channel to the eavesdropper.
Instead, SS follows by leveraging the heterogeneous version of the
strong soft-covering lemma and a CR-code reduction argument.
Optimality is a consequence of a max-inf upper bound on the
CR-assisted SS-capacity of an AVWTC with state sequences
constrained to any collection of type-classes. When adjusted to
the aforementioned compound WTC, the upper bound simplifies
to a max-min structure, thus strengthening the previously best
known single-letter upper bound by Liang et al. that has a
min-max form. The proof of the upper bound uses a novel
distribution coupling argument. The capacity formula shows that
the legitimate users effectively see an averaged main channel,
while security must be ensured versus an eavesdropper with
perfect channel state information. An example visualizes our
single-letter results, and their relation to the past multi-letter
secrecy-capacity characterization of the AVWTC is highlighted.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Modern communication systems usually present an architec-
tural separation between error correction and data encryption.
The former is typically realized at the physical layer by trans-
forming the noisy communication channel into a reliable “bit
pipe”. The data encryption is implemented on top of that by
applying cryptographic principles. The cryptographic approach
assumes no knowledge on the quality of the eavesdropper’s
channel and relies solely on restricting the computational
power of the eavesdropper. The looming prospect of quantum
computers (QCs) (some companies have recently reported a
working prototype of a QC with over than 1000 qbits [1]–[5]),
however, would boost computational abilities, rendering some
critical cryptosystems insecure and weakening others.1 Post-
QC cryptography offers partial solutions that rely on larger
keys, but even now considerable efforts are made to save
this expensive resource. Nonetheless, cryptography remains
the main practical tool for protecting data, at least for the
time being.
Physical Layer Security, rooted in information-theoretic
principles, is an alternative approach to provably secure com-
munication that dates back to Wyner’s celebrated paper on
the wiretap channel (WTC) [9]. Essentially, Wyner’s main
idea was to exploit the noise of the communication channel
along with proper physical layer coding to guarantee secrecy
against a computationally-unlimited eavesdropper. Protection
against such an eavesdropper, however, comes at a price of
assuming that the eavesdropper’s channel is perfectly known to
the legitimate parties and stays fixed during the transmission.
Many of the information-theoretic secrecy results that followed
relied on extending Wyner’s ideas, and therefore, are derived
under the same hypothesis. Much of the critique by the cryp-
tographic community towards information-theoretic security is
aimed exactly at that assumption.
Practical systems suffer from limited channel state informa-
tion (CSI) due to inaccuracies in the channel’s estimation pro-
cess and imperfect feedback. Furthermore, adversarial eaves-
droppers will refrain from providing the legitimate parties with
1More specifically, asymmetric ciphers that rely on the hardness of integer
factorization or discrete logarithms can be completely broken using QCs via
Shor’s algorithm (or a variant thereof) [6], [7]. Symmetric encryption, on the
other hand, would be weakened by QC attacks but could regain its strength
by increasing the size of the key [8]. This essentially follows since a QC can
search through a space of size 2n in time 2
n
2 , so by doubling the size of the
key a symmetric cryptosystem would offer the same protection versus a QC
attack, as the original system did versus a classic attack.
2any information about their channels to make securing the
data even harder. Accordingly, limited CSI (especially about
the eavesdropper’s channel) must be assumed to successfully
model a practical communication system. The model of an
arbitrarily varying WTC (AVWTC), that is the focus of this
work, does just that. The AVWTC combines the WTC [9],
[10] and the arbitrarily varying channel (AVC) [11]–[15]. It
consists of a collection of discrete-memoryless WTCs indexed
by elements in a finite state space. The state at each time
instance is chosen in an arbitrary manner and is unknown
to the legitimate parties. Being aware of the state space,
however, the legitimate users can place the actual channel
realization within a certain uncertainty set, which models their
limited eavesdropper’s CSI. A relaxed scenario where the main
channel is fixed in time but the eavesdropper’s channel is
varying and unknown was studied in [16]. The authors of [16]
considered the MIMO Gaussian case and proved the existence
of a universal secure coding scheme.
Inspired by wiretap channel instances that involve active
eavesdroppers [17]–[20], the AVWTC was first introduced in
[21]. The author of [21] derived single-letter lower and upper
bounds on the correlated-random (CR) assisted weak secrecy-
capacity of the AVWTC. The relation between the CR-assisted
weak secrecy-capacity and the uncorrelated weak secrecy-
capacity was also established in Theorem 5 of that work (see
also [22] for similar results for strong secrecy). It turns out that
it makes a difference whether CR codes or their uncorrelated
counterparts are used. In particular, the uncorrelated secrecy-
capacity may be zero (if the main channel is symmetrizable
[23, Definition 2]), while the CR-assisted secrecy-capacity is
positive. Thus, viewing CR as an additional resource for com-
munication, this resource can make communication possible
where it is impossible without, as long as the choice of the
state sequence is independent of the realization of the CR. On
the other hand, CR should not be viewed as a cryptographic
key to be exploited for secrecy, and therefore, it is assumed to
be known to the eavesdropper. A single-letter characterization
of the CR-assisted secrecy-capacity remains an open problem
and only a multi-letter description has been established [24],
[25]. Despite the computational infeasibility of that formula, it
was used in [25] to prove that the CR-assisted secrecy-capacity
of the AVWTC is a continuous function of the uncertainty
set. In contrast, the work of [26] showed that the same in
not true for uncorrelated secrecy-capacity, by exemplifying a
discontinuity point.
The challenge presented by the AVWTC is twofold. First,
it subsumes the difficulty of the compound WTC (where
the channel’s state is constant in time), for which a single-
letter secrecy-capacity characterization is also an open problem
[27]–[34]. While a multi-letter description of the compound
WTC’s secrecy-capacity was found in [33], it is currently un-
known how to single-letterize this expression. The underlying
gap is that while reliability must be ensured with respect to
the worst main channel, security is measured under the best
eavesdropper channel; a single channel state under which these
extremes simultaneously materialize, however, does not neces-
sarily exist. The second difficulty concerning AVWTCs is that
security must be ensured under all possible state sequences,
whose number grows exponentially with the blocklength. To
get single-letter results, the latter is usually dealt with by
assuming the existence of a best channel to the eavesdropper
and establishing secrecy with respect to that channel only (see,
e.g., [21], [35]). Yet, the only single-letter secrecy-capacity
characterization for an AVWTC that the authors are aware of
assumes even more [21, Theorem 4]. On top of the existence
of such a best channel, the derivation of [21, Theorem 4]
also relies on the AVWTC being strongly-degraded and having
independent (main channel and eavesdropper channel) states.
A related setting for which a single-letter formula is known is
an AVWTC where the CR is used as a secret key and there is a
sufficient amount thereof [22]. Although such a model slightly
deviates from the operational meaning of CR as considered in
this work, formally, it can be viewed as another scenario for
which the multi-letter formula from [25] is single-letterizable.
We consider a general AVWTC with a type constraint
on the allowed state sequences, and establish in Theorem 1
a single-letter characterization of its CR-assisted semantic-
security (SS) capacity. Our approach relies neither on the
existence of a best channel to the eavesdropper nor on the
benefit of secret CR. Instead, we show that the exponential
number of security requirements are satisfied, even while using
a random codebook construction under single-letter constraints
on the communication rate, via a finer analysis that uses
a heterogeneous strong soft-covering lemma, on which we
expand the discussion subsequently. A full characterization of
both the CR-assisted and the uncorrelated capacities of the
classic AVC with a pair of linear constraints on the state and
input sequences is due to Csisza´r and Narayan [23], [36]. The
extension of this setting to the AVWTC scenario is the focus
of [37], where a multi-letter description of the CR-assisted
secrecy-capacity is given. In our case, the type constraint
essentially means that the viable state sequences are only the
ones of the prescribed type. However, since a fixed distribution
(even if rational) is not a valid type for all blocklengths, we
define achievability by allowing the empirical distribution of
the state sequences to be within a small gap from the type.
By doing so, the type constrained AVWTC is well defined
for all blocklengths. As a consequence, our uncertainty set
is a typical set around the allowed type, which still contains
exponentially many state sequences. The structure of the CR-
assisted SS-capacity formula suggests that the legitimate users
effectively see the averaged channel (i.e., the expectation of
the main channels with respect to the type) while security
must be ensured versus an eavesdropper with perfect CSI. A
specific instance of a type constrained AVWTC that is related
to binary symmetric - binary erasure (BS-BE) WTC that was
studied in [38] is used to visualize the result.
The results are derived while adopting the prescription of
[39] to replace the commonly used strong secrecy metric with
the stricter SS metric [40], [41]. The authors of [39] advocate
SS as the new standard for information-theoretic security,
because from a cryptographic point of view, strong secrecy
is insufficient to provide security of applications. Its main
drawback lies in the assumption that the message is random
and uniformly distributed, as real-life messages are neither
(messages may be files, votes or any type of structured data,
3often with low entropy). In turn, the uniformly distributed
message makes the strong secrecy metric an average quantity,
that might converge even when many2 of the messages are
actually not secured. Furthermore, to eliminate the benefit of
CR for secrecy purposes, we demand that SS holds for each
realization of the CR (a similar approach was taken in [24],
[25] with respect to the strong secrecy metric). This essentially
means that the transmission is semantically-secure even if the
choice of the state sequence depends on the realization of
the CR.
In Lemma 1 we develop a heterogeneous soft-covering
analysis tool that is key in ensuring SS under the exponentially
many state sequences of the AVWTC. By means of the
Chernoff bound, the lemma guarantees a double-exponential
decay of the probability that soft-covering fails to occur under
the relative entropy metric. The probability is taken with
respect to a random codebook and the convergence occurs
as long as the rate of the codebook is greater than the mutual
information between the channel’s input and output random
variables. In turn, this allows us to furnish a single-letter
achievability result without assuming that a best channel to the
eavesdropper exists. Doubly-exponentially decaying probabil-
ities coming from the Chernoff bound were previously used
in the context of secrecy in, e.g., [22], [24], [25], [33], [35],
[42]. In particular, claims similar to these presented in this
work (but under the total variation metric) were used in [22],
[24], [25] for the security analysis under the AVWTC scenario.
Similar concentration results also previously appeared in quan-
tum information theory sources [43], [44]. Nevertheless, we
emphasize the significance of the strong soft-covering lemma
as a stand-alone claim because of the effectiveness of soft-
covering in proofs of secrecy, resolvability [45], [46], and
channel synthesis [47]. Furthermore, the convergence to 0 of
the relative entropy implied by Lemma 1 naturally relates to
the definition of SS that uses mutual information.
To prove our coding theorem for the type constrained
AVWTC (i.e., the main result in Theorem 1), we provide
both a stronger achievability and a stronger converse than is
actually required. The broader achievability claim, found in
Theorem 2, is a lower bound on the CR-assisted SS-capacity
of an AVWTC with state sequences constrained by any convex
and closed set of state PMFs. This bound shows that the best
known achievable single-letter secrecy rates for a similarly
constrained compound WTC [29], [33] can be achieved also
in the AVWTC.3 The lower bound is derived by first generating
a CR-code over a large family of uncorrelated codes, whose
size grows doubly-exponentially with the blocklength, and
establish reliability by arguments similar to those used for the
classic AVC with constrained states [36]. Then, we invoke a
Chernoff bound to show that a uniform CR-code over a family
that is no more than polynomial in size is sufficient. Having
this, SS follows via the union bound and the strong soft-
covering lemma, because the combined number of codes, state
sequences and messages grows only exponentially with the
2The number of unsecured messages may even grow exponentially with the
blocklength, while still having a converging strong secrecy metric.
3This connection is expounded in Remark 15.
blocklenght. The lemma is still sharp enough to imply that the
probability of a random codebook violating security is doubly-
exponentially small. The obtained single-letter achievability
formula is shown to be recoverable from the multi-letter CR-
assisted secrecy-capacity description from [24], [25] when
specialized to the unconstrained states scenario.
The polynomial size of the reduced CR-code is of conse-
quence for the uncorrelated scenario as well. Provided that
the uncorrelated SS-capacity is strictly positive, the relatively
small CR-code allows to replace the shared randomness be-
tween the legitimate parties (used for selecting a code from
the family) with a local randomness at the transmitter. The
transmitter may select the code and inform the receiver which
code is in use by sending its index as a short prefix. The
positivity of the uncorrelated capacity is essential to allow
the reliable transmission of the short prefix with a vanishing
rate. Thus, the missing piece for establishing the uncorrelated
SS-capacity of the type constrained AVWTC is a dichotomy
result (in the spirit of [12], [15]) based on a condition
that distinguishes weather its uncorrelated and CR-assisted
secrecy-capacities are equal or not. Such results are available
for AVWTCs without constraints on the state space [21], [22],
[35]. CR SS-capacity being the focus of this work, we pose the
dichotomy result and the corresponding threshold property for
the constrained states scenario as questions for future research.
To prove the converse part of the main result, we claim
in Theorem 3 an upper bound on CR-assisted SS-capacity of
an AVWTC with state sequences from any collection of type-
classes. The upper bound is of a max-inf form, i.e., first an
infimum over the constraint set is taken, and then the result is
maximized over the input distributions. When specializing the
result to the aforementioned compound WTC, it produces an
upper bound that improves upon the previously best known
single-letter upper bound for this setting [29, Theorem 2].
The latter result has a min-max structure, while our upper
bound has a max-min form. This strengthening is due to a
derivation that is uniform over the constraint set. The analysis
is preformed per each type in the set and shows that reliability
and SS under states from even a single type-class imply similar
performance limits as the same channel but where the state
sequence is independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.)
according to the type. The main challenge is in upper bounding
the normalized equivocation of the message given an output
sequence that is generated by the average channel. This step
relies on the equivocation being continuous in the set of viable
state sequences. A novel distribution coupling argument is
used to establish this desired property.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II provides
definitions and basic properties. In Section III we state and
prove the heterogeneous strong soft-covering lemma. The
AVWTC with type constrained states is studied in Section
IV, where the setup is defined and the CR-assisted SS-
capacity is characterized and proven. Section IV also states
the lower and upper bounds for the more general setup, relates
the achievability result to past multi-letter descriptions of
the CR-assisted secrecy-capacity and provides an example.
The lower and upper bounds are proven in Sections V and
VI, respectively. Finally, Section VII summarizes the main
4achievements and insights of this work.
II. NOTATIONS AND PRELIMINARIES
We use the following notations. As customary N is the set
of natural numbers (which does not include 0), Q denotes
the rational numbers, while R are the reals. We further define
R+ = {x ∈ R|x ≥ 0} and R++ = {x ∈ R|x > 0}. Given
two real numbers a, b, we denote by [a :b] the set of integers{
n ∈ N
∣∣⌈a⌉ ≤ n ≤ ⌊b⌋}. Calligraphic letters denote sets, e.g.,
X , the complement of X is denoted by X c, while |X | stands
for its cardinality. Xn denotes the n-fold Cartesian product of
X . An element of Xn is denoted by xn = (x1, x2, . . . , xn);
whenever the dimension n is clear from the context, vectors
(or sequences) are denoted by boldface letters, e.g., x. For any
S ⊆ [1 : n], we use xS = (xi)i∈S to denote the substring of
xn defined by S, with respect to the natural ordering of S.
For instance, if S = [i : j], where 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n, then xS =
(xi, xi+1, . . . , xj). For S = [i : j] as before we sometimes
write xji instead of xS ; when i = 1, the subscript is omitted.
We also use xn\i instead xS , when S = [1 : i−1]∪ [i+1 : n],
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Let
(
X ,F ,P
)
be a probability space, where X is the sample
space, F is the σ-algebra and P is the probability measure.
Random variables over
(
X ,F ,P
)
are denoted by uppercase
letters, e.g., X , with conventions for random vectors similar
to those for deterministic sequences. The probability of an
event A ∈ F is denoted by P(A), while P(A
∣∣B ) denotes
conditional probability of A given B. We use 1A to denote
the indicator function of A. The set of all probability mass
functions (PMFs) on a finite set X is denoted by P(X ), i.e.,
P(X ) =
{
P : X → [0, 1]
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
x∈X
P (x) = 1]
}
. (1)
PMFs are denoted by the uppercase letters such as P or Q,
with a subscript that identifies the random variable and its
possible conditioning. For example, for a discrete probability
space
(
X ,F ,P
)
and two correlated random variables X and
Y over that space, we use PX , PX,Y and PX|Y to denote,
respectively, the marginal PMF of X , the joint PMF of (X,Y )
and the conditional PMF of X given Y . In particular, PX|Y
represents the stochastic matrix whose elements are given
by PX|Y (x|y) = P
(
X = x|Y = y
)
. Expressions such as
PX,Y = PXPY |X are to be understood as PX,Y (x, y) =
PX(x)PY |X(y|x), for all (x, y) ∈ X ×Y . Accordingly, when
three random variables X , Y and Z satisfy PX|Y,Z = PX|Y ,
they form a Markov chain, which we denote by X − Y − Z .
We omit subscripts if the arguments of a PMF are lowercase
versions of the random variables. The support of a PMF P and
the expectation of a real-valued random variableX are denoted
by supp(P ) and E
[
X
]
, respectively. If X ∼ P , we emphasize
that an expectation is taken with respect to the distribution on
X by writing EX or EP (choosing the simpler of the two).
Similarly, we use HP and IP to indicate that an entropy or
a mutual information term are calculated with respect to a
PMF P .
For a discrete measurable space (X ,F), a PMF Q ∈ P(X )
gives rise to a probability measure on (X ,F), which we
denote by PQ; accordingly, PQ
(
A) =
∑
x∈AQ(x), for every
A ∈ F . For a sequence of random variable Xn, if the
entries of Xn are drawn in an independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) manner according to PX , then for every
x ∈ Xn we have PXn(x) =
∏n
i=1 PX(xi) and we write
PXn(x) = P
n
X(x). Similarly, if for every (x,y) ∈ Xn × Yn
we have PY n|Xn(y|x) =
∏n
i=1 PY |X(yi|xi), then we write
PY n|Xn(y|x) = PnY |X(y|x). We often use Q
n
X or Q
n
Y |X
when referring to an i.i.d. sequence of random variables.
The conditional product PMF PnY |X given a specific sequence
x ∈ Xn is denoted by PnY |X=x.
The type νx of a sequence x ∈ Xn is
νx(x) ,
N(x|x)
n
, (2)
where N(x|x) =
∑n
i=1 1{xi=x}. The subset of P(X ) that
contains all possible types of sequences x ∈ Xn is denoted
by Pn(X ). By [48, Lemma II.1],∣∣Pn(X )∣∣ =
(
n+ |X | − 1
|X | − 1
)
≤ (n+ 1)|X |. (3)
For P ∈ Pn(X ), the type-class
{
x ∈ Xn
∣∣νx = P} is denoted
by T nP . We use T nǫ (P ) to denote the set of letter-typical
sequences with respect to the PMF P ∈ P(X ) and the non-
negative number ǫ defined by
T nǫ (P ) =
{
x ∈ Xn
∣∣∣∣∣νx(x)− P (x)∣∣ ≤ ǫ
|X |
1{P (x)>0}
}
. (4)
This definition of the letter-typical set resembles this from [49,
Chapter 2], with the only difference being the normalization of
ǫ by |X |. This gives rise to an upper bound on the probability
of an i.i.d. sequence being atypical that is uniform in the
underlying i.i.d. distribution. Namely, by a simple adaptation
of [49, Lemma 2.12], if Xn is i.i.d. according to P ∈ P(X ),
then
PPn
(
Xn /∈ T nǫ (P )
)
≤ 2|X |e
−2n ǫ2
|X|2 . (5)
This uniform bound plays an important role in the proof of
Theorem 3, where an upper bound on the CR-assisted SS-
capacity of the AVWTC is established.
Definition 1 (Relative Entropy) Let (X ,F) be a measur-
able space and let P and Q be two probability measures on
F , with P ≪ Q (i.e., P is absolutely continuous with respect
to Q). The relative entropy between P and Q is
D(P ||Q) =
∫
X
dP log
(
dP
dQ
)
, (6)
where dPdQ denotes the Radon-Nikodym derivative between P
and Q. If the sample space X is countable, (6) reduces to
D(P ||Q) =
∑
x∈supp(P )
P (x) log
(
P (x)
Q(x)
)
. (7)
Definition 2 (Total Variation) Let (X ,F) be a measurable
and P and Q be two probability measures on F . The total
variation between P and Q is
||P −Q||TV = sup
A∈F
∣∣P (A)−Q(A)∣∣. (8)
5PSfrag replacements
W ∼ Unif(Wn)
Bn=
{
U(w)
} U(W )
QnV |U,S=s
V ∼ P
(s)
V|Bn=Bn
Fig. 1: Coding problem with the goal of making P (s)V|Bn=Bn
resemble QnV |S=s.
If the sample space X is countable, (8) reduces to
||P −Q||TV =
1
2
∑
x∈X
∣∣P (x)−Q(x)∣∣. (9)
III. HETEROGENEOUS STRONG SOFT-COVERING LEMMA
We present here a generalization of the original strong soft-
covering lemma first established by the authors in [50, Lemma
1]. The lemma in this work is a heterogeneous version on the
original homogeneous claim. Lemma 1 from [50] considers
a discrete-memoryless channel (DMC) that does not change
throughout the block transmission, while here the memoryless
channel may vary from symbol to symbol. This variation is
modeled as an n-fold state-dependent channel QnV |U,S over
which a codeword u ∈ Un is transmitted under a state
sequence s ∈ Sn. Thus, in each time instance i ∈ [1 : n], the
i-th symbol of u is transmitted over the channel QV |U,S=si .
Let Bn be a randomly generated codebook of u-sequence,
one of which is selected uniformly at random and passed
through the channel QnV |U,S=s. Lemma 1 gives a sufficient
condition for the induced conditional distribution of the chan-
nel output given the state to result in a good approximation of
QnV |S=s in the limit of large n, for any s ∈ S
n (Fig. 1). The
proximity between the induced and the desired distributions is
measured in terms of relative entropy. Specifically, we show
that as long as the codebook is of size |Bn| = 2nR with
R > I(U ;V |S), where the mutual information is calculated
with respect to the empirical PMF νs of the state sequence, the
relative entropy vanishes exponentially quickly with the block-
length n, with high probability with respect to the random
codebook. Via the Chenoff bound, the negligible probability
of the random set not producing this desired result is doubly-
exponentially small.
The heterogeneous strong soft-covering lemma is subse-
quently invoked for the SS analysis of the AVWTC, where the
double-exponential decay it provides plays a key role. Similar
claims that use total variation were previously made in the
context of AVWTCs in [22], [24], [25] (in particular, see [22,
Lemma 1]), though the codebook design was slightly different
in those works. The stronger notion of soft-covering was also
previously observed in works on quantum information theory
[43], [44]. We emphasize Lemma 1 as a stand-alone tool due
to its simplicity, and consequently, the prospect of it coming
in handy for other proofs of secrecy, channel resolvability,
channel synthesis, etc.
A. Soft-Covering Setup and Result
Let S be a finite set and let s ∈ Sn be a sequence with an
empirical PMF νs. Let Bn =
{
U(w)
}
w∈Wn , where
4 Wn =
[1 : 2nR] with R ∈ R+, be a set of random vectors that
are i.i.d. according to QnU|S=s, where QU|S : S → P(U).
We refer to Bn as the random codebook, denote by Bn the
set of all its possible realizations, while a specific realization
is denoted by Bn =
{
u(w)
}
w∈Wn . For every Bn ∈ Bn, a
sequence u(w) is randomly and uniformly selected and passed
through a memoryless non-stationary channel QnV |U,S=s. For
each s ∈ Sn, the induced joint distribution of Bn, W and V
is
P
(s)
Bn,W,V
(Bn, w,v)
=
[ ∏
w′∈Wn
QnU|S
(
u(w′)
∣∣s)
]
2−nR ·QnV |U,S
(
v
∣∣u(w), s),
(10)
which gives rise to a probability measure denoted by P.5
When switching to other probability measures, we do so in
accordance to the notations defined in Section II. On account
of (10), the induced output distribution conditioned on a
codebook Bn ∈ Bn for each state sequence s ∈ Sn is:
P
(s)
V|Bn(v|Bn) = 2
−nR ∑
w∈Wn
QnV |U,S
(
v
∣∣u(w), s). (11)
The following lemma states that as long as the codebook is of
size 2nR, with6 R > IνsQ(U ;V |S), the induced output PMF
constitutes a good approximation of QnV |S=s in the limit of
large n, with high probability. Namely, the probability that
the relative entropy between the induced PMF and product
PMF vanishes exponentially quickly with the blocklength n,
is double exponentially close to 1.
Lemma 1 (Heterogeneous Strong Soft-Covering Lemma)
For s ∈ Sn with empirical PMF νs, and any ζ > 0,
QU,V |S : S → P(U × V), and R > IνsQ(U ;V |S) + ζ, where
|S|, |V| < ∞, there exist γ1, γ2 > 0, such that for n large
enough
P
(
D
(
P
(s)
V|Bn
∣∣∣∣∣∣QnV |S=s) > e−nγ1
)
≤ e−e
nγ2
. (12)
More precisely, for any n ∈ N and δ ∈ (0, R−IνsQ(U ;V |S))
P
(
D
(
P
(s)
V|Bn
∣∣∣∣∣∣QnV |S=s) > cδn2−nγδ
)
≤
(
1 + |V|n
)
e−
1
3 2
nδ
,
(13)
where
γδ =sup
η>1
η−1
2η−1
(
R−δ−max
s∈S
dη(QU,V |S=s,QU|S=sQV |S=s)
)
(14a)
4To simplify notation, we assume that 2nR is an integer, for all n ∈ N.
Otherwise, simple modifications of some of the subsequent expressions using
floor operations are needed.
5Since s ∈ Sn stays fixed throughout this section, the notation P omits the
dependence of the state sequence.
6The subscript νsQ indicates that the mutual information is calculated with
respect to νsQU|SQV |U,S
6cδ = 3 log e + γδ2 log 2 + 2 log

 max
(s,v)∈S×V:
QV |S(v|s)>0
1
QV |S(v|s)

 ,
(14b)
and dη(µ, ν) = 1η−1 log2
∫
dµ
(
dµ
dν
)1−η
is the Re´nyi diver-
gence of order η.
The proof of Lemma 1 bears close resemblance to the proof
of the homogeneous version of the strong soft-covering lemma
from [50, Lemma 1]. The main difference, is in the bound on
the expected value of the probability of atypical sequences.
To avoid verbatim repetition of the arguments from [50], we
summarize (most of) the technical parts from the proof of the
homogeneous case in our Lemma 2 and invoke it to establish
Lemma 1.
The important quantity in the lemma above is γδ, which is
the exponent that soft-covering achieves. We see in (13) that
the double-exponential convergence of probability occurs with
exponent δ > 0. Thus, the best soft-covering exponent that the
lemma achieves with confidence, over all δ > 0, is
γ∗ = sup
δ>0
γδ
= γ0
= sup
η>1
η−1
2η−1
(
R−max
s∈S
dη(QU,V |S=s,QU|S=sQV |S=s)
)
.
(15)
The double-exponential confidence rate δ acts as a reduction in
codebook rate R in the definition of γδ. Consequently, γδ = 0
for δ ≥ R− IνsQ(U ;V |S).
Remark 1 The role of ζ in the statement of Lemma 1 is merely
to ensure that a fixed δ ∈ (0, R − IνsQ(U ;V |S)) can be
found for all n. Since the mutual information is calculated
with respect to νs, its value may vary with n. Taking R >
IνsQ(U ;V |S)+ζ implies that (0, ζ) ⊆
(
0, R−IνsQ(U ;V |S)
)
,
and therefore, a fixed value of δ as needed exists.
Remark 2 (Total Variation Exponent of Decay) The
strong soft-covering lemma can be reproduced while
replacing the relative entropy with total variation. Although,
relative entropy can be used to bound total variation via
Pinsker’s inequality, this approach causes a loss of a factor
of 2 in the exponent of decay. Alternatively, the proof of
Lemma 1 can be modified to produce the bound on the total
variation instead of the relative entropy. This direct method
keeps the error exponents the same for the total variation
case as it is for relative entropy.
Proof of Lemma 1: We state the proof in terms of arbi-
trary distributions QU|S and QV |U,S (not necessarily discrete).
We assume |S| < ∞, and will specialize to a finite output
alphabet V only when needed.
First, define conditional information density iQU,V |S=s ,
which is a function on the space U × V specified by
iQU,V |S=s(u, v) , log
(
dQV |U=u,S=s
dQV |S=s
(v)
)
. (16)
In (16), the argument of the logarithm is the Radon-Nikodym
derivative between QV |U=u,S=s and QV |S=s. Let ǫ ≥ 0 be
arbitrary, and define the conditional jointly typical set of u-
and v-sequences given s as
Aǫ(s),
{
(u,v)∈Un×Vn
∣∣∣∣ 1niQnU,V |S=s(u,v)<I(U ;V |S)+ǫ
}
(17)
and note that
iQn
U,V |S=s
(u,v) =
n∑
t=1
iQU,V |S=st (ut, vt). (18)
For brevity, in (17) and henceforth, we use I(U ;V |S) instead
of IνsQ(U ;V |S).
Next, for every Bn ∈ Bn, we split P (s)V|Bn=Bn into two parts,
making use of the indicator function. For every v ∈ Vn, define
P
(1)
Bn,s(v), 2
−nR ∑
w∈Wn
QnV |U,S
(
v
∣∣u(w), s)1{(
u(w),v
)
∈Aǫ(s)
}
(19a)
P
(2)
Bn,s(v), 2
−nR ∑
w∈Wn
QnV |U,S
(
v
∣∣u(w), s)1{(
u(w),v
)
/∈Aǫ(s)
}.
(19b)
The measures P (1)Bn,s and P
(2)
Bn,s on the space V
n are not
probability measures, but P (1)Bn,s+P
(2)
Bn,s = P
(s)
V|Bn=Bn for each
codebook Bn ∈ Bn. For every v ∈ Vn, we define
∆Bn,s(v) =
dP
(s)
V|Bn=Bn
dQnV |S=s
(v), (20)
where the right-hand side (RHS) is the Radon-Nikodym
derivative between P (s)V|Bn=Bn and Q
n
V |S=s, and also split it
into ∆Bn,s(v) = ∆
(1)
Bn,s(v) + ∆
(2)
Bn,s(v), where
∆
(1)
Bn,s(v) ,
dP
(1)
Bn,s
dQnV |S=s
(v) (21a)
∆
(2)
Bn,s(v) ,
dP
(2)
Bn,s
dQnV |S=s
(v). (21b)
To see that the RHS of (20) indeed exists, on could easily
verify that P (s)V|Bn=Bn is absolutely continuous with respect
to QnV |S=s. This essentially follows since if Q
n
V |S=s(A) =
0, for some A ⊆ Vn, then QnV |U=u,S=s(A) = 0, for every
u ∈ supp
(
QnU|S=s
)
. The structure of P (s)V|Bn=Bn given in
(11) then implies that P (s)V|Bn=Bn(A) = 0.
Note that
∫
dP
(2)
Bn,s
is an average of exponentially many i.i.d.
random variables bounded between 0 and 1, given by∫
dP
(2)
Bn,s
=
∑
w∈Wn
2−nR · PQn
V |U,S=s
((
U(w),V
)
/∈ Aǫ(s)
∣∣∣U(w)).
(22)
With respect to (22) and the above definitions, the hetero-
geneous strong soft-covering lemma is established by the
7following technical lemma.
Lemma 2 Let |S|, |V| <∞ and ǫ ≥ 0. If there exist α, βǫ > 0
such that
EBnPQnV |U,S=s
((
U(w),V
)
/∈ Aǫ(s)
∣∣∣U(w)) ≤ 2−nβǫ (23a)
P
(
∆
(2)
Bn,s
(v) ≤ αn
)
= 1, ∀v ∈ Vn, (23b)
then
P
(
D
(
P
(s)
V|Bn
∣∣∣∣∣∣QnV |S=s) ≥ cβ,ǫ,αn2−nβǫ
)
≤ e−
1
32
n(R−βǫ)
+ |V|ne−
1
3 2
n(R−I(U;V |S)−ǫ−2βǫ)
, (24)
where cβ,ǫ,α = 3 log e+ 2βǫ log 2 + 2 logα.
Lemma 2 essentially follows from the proof of Lemma 1
from [50]. More specifically, the derivation repeats the steps
between Equations (18) and (40) in the proof of [50, Lemma
1] and is, therefore, omitted. Having this, it remains to be
shown that (23) holds for certain positive βǫ and α. For (23a),
observe that
EBnPQnV |U,S=s
((
U(w),V
)
/∈ Aǫ(s)
∣∣∣U(w))
= PQn
U,V |S=s
((
U,V
)
/∈ Aǫ(s)
)
= PQn
U,V |S=s
(
n∑
t=1
iQU,V |S=st (Ut, Vt) ≥ n
(
I(U ;V |S) + ǫ
))
(a)
= PQn
U,V |S=s
(
2
λ
∑n
t=1 iQU,V |S=st
(Ut,Vt) ≥ 2nλ(I(U ;V |S)+ǫ)
)
(b)
≤
EQn
U,V |S=s
2
λ
∑n
t=1 iQU,V |S=st
(Ut,Vt)
2nλ(I(U ;V |S)+ǫ)
, (25)
where (a) is true for any λ ≥ 0 and (b) is Markov’s inequality.
For the numerator on the RHS of (25), we have
EQn
U,V |S=s
2
λ
∑n
t=1 iQU,V |S=st
(Ut,Vt)
(a)
=
n∏
t=1
EQU,V |S=st2
λiQU,V |S=st
(Ut,Vt)
≤
(
max
t∈[1:n]
EQU,V |S=st2
λiQU,V |S=st
(Ut,Vt)
)n
(b)
≤
(
max
s∈S
EQU,V |S=s2
λiQU,V |S=s(Us,Vs)
)n
, (26)
where (a) uses the independence across time, while (b) follows
because |S| < ∞ and by defining (Us, Vs) ∼ QU,V |S=s.
Plugging (26) back into (25), gives
EBnPQnV |U,S=s
((
U(w),V
)
/∈ Aǫ(s)
∣∣∣U(w))
≤
(
maxs∈S EQU,V |S=s2
λiQU,V |S=s (Us,Vs)
2λ(I(U ;V |S)+ǫ)
)n
=

2
log2
(
max
s∈S
EQU,V |S=s
2
λiQU,V |S=s
(Us,Vs)
)
2λ(I(U ;V |S)+ǫ)


n
(a)
=

2
λmax
s∈S
1
λ
log2
(
EQU,V |S=s2
λiQU,V |S=s
(Us,Vs)
)
2λ(I(U ;V |S)+ǫ)


n
= 2
nλ
(
max
s∈S
1
λ
log2 EQU,V |S=s
[
2
λiQU,V |S=s
(Us,Vs)
]
−I(U ;V |S)−ǫ
)
(b)
= 2
nλ
(
max
s∈S
dλ+1(QU,V |S=s,QU|S=sQV |S=s)−I(U ;V |S)−ǫ
)
, (27)
where (a) is because the logarithm is non-decreasing and by
restricting λ to be strictly positive, while (b) is from the
definition of the Re´nyi divergence of order λ+1. Substituting
η = λ+ 1 into (27) yields
EBnPQnV |U,S=s
((
U(w),V
)
/∈ Aǫ(s)
∣∣∣U(w)) ≤ 2−nβη,ǫ ,
(28)
where
βη,ǫ = (η − 1)
(
I(U ;V |S) + ǫ
−max
s∈S
dη(QU,V |S=s, QU|S=sQV |S=s)
)
,
(29)
for every η > 1 and ǫ ≥ 0. Thus (23a) holds with βη,ǫ in the
role of βǫ.
The relation in (23b) follows by noting that |S|, |V| < ∞
implies that for any v ∈ Vn and Bn ∈ Bn, we have
∆
(2)
Bn,s(v) ≤

 max
(s,v)∈S×V:
QV |S(v|s)>0
1
QV |S(v|s)


n
. (30)
Notice that the maximum is only over the pair (s, v) for
which QV |S(v|s) > 0, which makes this bound finite. The
underlying reason for this restriction is that with probability
one a conditional distribution is absolutely continuous with
respect to its associated marginal distribution. By (30), we
obtain
P
(
∆
(2)
Bn,s
(v) ≤ αn
)
= 1, ∀v ∈ Vn, (31)
with
α = max
(s,v)∈S×V:
QV |S(v|s)>0
1
QV |S(v|s)
. (32)
Thus, by Lemma 2 we have (24) with βη,ǫ and α from (29)
and (32), respectively. Recalling that we may optimize over
η > 1 and ǫ ≥ 0, we fix δ ∈
(
0, R− I(U ;V |S)
)
and set
ǫη,δ =
1
2 (R−δ)+(η−1)maxs∈S
dη(QU,V |S=s,QU|S=sQV |S=s)
1
2 + (η − 1)
− I(U ;V |S). (33)
Substituting into βη,ǫ gives
βη,δ , βη,ǫη,δ
=
η−1
2η−1
(
R−δ−max
s∈S
dη(QU,V |S=s,QU|S=sQV |S=s)
)
.
(34)
8Plugging α and βη,δ into cβ,ǫ,α, which we relabel as cη,δ , we
have
cη,δ = 3 log e+2βη,δ log 2+2 log

 max
(s,v)∈S×V:
QV |S(v|s)>0
1
QV |S(v|s)

.
(35)
Observe that ǫη,δ in (33) is non-negative under the assumption
that R− δ > I(U ;V |S), because η > 1 and
max
s∈S
dη(QU,V |S=s, QU|S=sQV |S=s)
≥ max
s∈S
d1(QU,V |S=s, QU|S=sQV |S=s)
≥ I(U ;V |S). (36)
Reevaluating (24) based on (33)-(35) gives
P
(
D
(
P
(s)
V|Bn
∣∣∣∣∣∣QnV |S=s) ≥ cη,δn2−nβη,δ
)
≤ e−
1
3 2
n(R−βη,ǫ)
+ |V|ne−
1
32
n(R−I(U;V |S)−ǫη,δ−2βη,δ)
= e−
1
3 2
n(R−βη,δ)
+ |V|n · e−
1
32
nδ
(a)
≤ (1 + |V|n) e−
1
32
nδ
, (37)
where (a) is because βη,δ ≤ 12 (R − δ). Denoting cδ ,
supη>1 cη,δ , (37) further gives
P
(
D
(
P
(s)
V|Bn
∣∣∣∣∣∣QnV |S=s)≥ cδn2−nβη,δ)≤ (1 + |V|n) e− 132nδ.
(38)
Since (38) is true for all η > 1, it must also be true, with strict
inequality in the LHS, when replacing βη,δ with
γδ , sup
η>1
βη,δ
=sup
η>1
η−1
2η−1
(
R−δ−max
s∈S
dη(QU,V |S=s,QU|S=sQV |S=s)
)
which is the exponential rate of convergence stated in (14a)
that we derive for the heterogeneous strong soft-covering
lemma. This establishes the statement from (13) and proves
Lemma 1.
Concluding, if R > I(U ;V |S)+ζ, for any ζ > 0 arbitrarily
small, then for any δ ∈
(
0, R−I(U ;V |S)
)
, we get exponential
convergence of the relative entropy at rate O(2−nγδ ) with
double-exponential certainty. Discarding the precise exponents
of convergence and coefficients, we state that there exist
γ1, γ2 > 0, such that for n large enough
P
(
D
(
P
(s)
V|Bn
∣∣∣∣∣∣QnV |S=s) > e−nγ1
)
≤ e−e
nγ2
. (39)
IV. ARBITRARILY VARYING WIRETAP CHANNELS WITH
TYPE CONSTRAINED STATES
A. Problem Setup and Definitions
Let X , Y , Z and S be finite sets. A discrete-memoryless
(DM) arbitrarily varying wiretap channel (AVWTC), as il-
lustrated in Fig. 2, is defined by a pair (W,V) of families
of channels W =
{
Ws : X → P(Y)
∣∣s ∈ S} and
PSfrag replacements
m
Enc fn (W,V)
Xn
AVWTC
Y ns
Zns
Dec φn
Eavesdropper
mˆ
m
s ∈ SnQ
Fig. 2: The AVWTC with Q-constrained states, i.e., when the
allowed state sequences have empirical PMFs that belong toQ.
V =
{
Vs : X → P(Z)
∣∣s ∈ S}, from X to Y and Z ,
respectively. Thus, s ∈ S denotes the state of the channels
and can be interpreted as an index identifying a particular
pair (W,V ) ∈W×V.
The n-th extension of the channel laws for input x ∈ Xn
and outputs y ∈ Yn and z ∈ Zn, under the state sequence
s ∈ Sn are
Wns (y|x) ,
n∏
i=1
Wsi(yi|xi) (40a)
V ns (z|x) ,
n∏
i=1
Vsi(zi|xi). (40b)
The families of channels Wns : Xn → P(Yn) and V ns :
Xn → P(Zn), for s ∈ Sn, are denoted by Wn and Vn,
respectively, and (Wn,Vn) is referred to as the (n-fold)
AVWTC. The random variables representing the outputs of the
AVWTC (Wn,Vn) observed by the legitimate user and by the
eavesdropper under the state sequence s ∈ Sn are denoted by
Y ns and Zns , respectively.
For any Q ⊆ P(S) define
SnQ ,
{
s ∈ Sn
∣∣∣νs ∈ Q}. (41)
We impose a constraint Q on the allowed state sequences, i.e.,
only s ∈ SnQ are permitted. The triple (Wn,Vn,Q) is referred
to as the (n-fold) Q-constrained AVWTC. We subsequently
focus on the type constrained AVWTC formally defined in
Definitions 9 and 10. Intuitively, one may think of the type
constrained scenario as corresponding to Q being a singleton,
i.e., Q =
{
QS
}
, for some QS ∈ P(S). However, such a
setting would not be well-defined if QS is not a rational
distribution. Even if QS is rational, it is not a valid type for
all n ∈ N, thus restricting the feasible blocklengths for the
AVWTC. To circumvent these pathologies, in Definitions 9
and 10 we restrict the state sequences to have types that are
close to QS , but not necessarily QS itself.
Remark 3 One easily verifies that defining an AVWTC in
terms of the pair (Wn,Vn) is without loss of generality. In
general, any state-input pair (s, x) ∈ S × X induces a joint
conditional output PMF Us(·, ·|x) ∈ P(Y ×Z). However, the
performance of any of the codes defined below is measured
with respect to the marginal output PMFs Ws(·|x) ∈ P(Y)
9and Vs(·|x) ∈ P(Z). Thus, under the framework presented
here, all AVWTCs with the same marginals W and V are
equivalent.
Definition 3 (Uncorrelated Code) An uncorrelated
(n,Mn)-code cn for the AVWTC (Wn,Vn) has a message
set Mn = [1 : Mn], a stochastic encoder fn :Mn → P(Xn)
and decoder φn : Yn → Mˆn, where Mˆn , Mn ∪ {e} and
e /∈Mn is an error symbol.
For any uncorrelated (n,Mn)-code cn and state sequence
s ∈ Sn, the induced joint PMF on Mn×Xn×Yn×Zn×Mˆ is
P
(cn,s)
M,X,Ys,Zs,Mˆ
(m,x,y, z, mˆ)
, PM (m)fn(x|m)W
n
s (y|x)V
n
s (z|x)1
{
mˆ=φn(y)
}, (42)
where PM ∈ P(Mn). The performance of cn on the type
constrained AVWTC (Wn,Vn, QS) is evaluated in terms of
its rate 1n logMn, the maximal decoding error probability and
the SS-metric. Reliability and security must be ensured with
respect to every allowed constrained state sequence.
Definition 4 (Message Error Probability) Let cn be an un-
correlated (n,Mn)-code for the AVWTC (Wn,Vn). For any
m ∈Mn and s ∈ Sn, let em(Wns , cn) be the error probability
in decoding m under the state sequence s, given by
em(W
n
s , cn) =
∑
x∈Xn
fn(x|m)
∑
y∈Yn:
φn(y) 6=m
Wns (y|x). (43)
Definition 5 (SS Metric) Let cn be an uncorrelated (n,Mn)-
code for the AVWTC (Wn,Vn). The information leakage to
the eavesdropper under the state sequence s ∈ Sn and the
message PMF PM ∈ P(Mn) is
ℓ(V ns , PM , cn) = Icn(M ;Zs), (44)
where the subscript cn denotes that the mutual information
term is calculated with respect to the induced joint distribution
P
(cn,s)
M,Zn
s
from (42). For any Q ⊆ P(S), the SS metric with
respect to cn and the Q-constrained AVWTC (Wn,Vn,Q) is7
ℓSem(V
n,Q, cn) = max
s∈SnQ,
PM∈P(Mn)
ℓ(V ns , PM , cn). (45)
Remark 4 We use the convention that the maximum over
an empty set is −∞. Accordingly if Q contains no rational
distributions then ℓSem(Vn,Q, cn) = −∞, for all n ∈ N.
Even when there exists QS ∈ Pn(S) such that QS ∈ Q, there
are blocklengths n for which νs 6= QS for every s ∈ Sn, and
consequently, ℓSem(Vn,Q, cn) = −∞ for these values of n
as well.
Remark 5 SS requires that the uncorrelated code cn works
well for all message PMFs. This means that the mutual
7ℓSem(V
n,Q, cn) is actually the mutual-information-security (MIS) met-
ric, which is equivalent to SS by [39]. We use the representation in (45) rather
than the formal definition of SS (see, e.g., [39, Equation (4)]) out of analytical
convenience.
information term in (45) is maximized over PM when cn
is known. In other words, although not stated explicitly, the
optimal PM is a function of cn.
We proceed with defining correlated random (CR) codes,
their associated maximal error probability and SS-metric, CR-
assisted achievability and CR-assisted secrecy-capacity.
Definition 6 (CR Code, Error Probability and SS Metric)
A CR (n,Mn,Kn)-code Cn for the AVWTC (Wn,Vn)
is given by a family of uncorrelated (n,Mn)-codes
Cn =
{
cn(γ)
}
γ∈Γn , where Γn = [1 : Kn], and a PMF
µn ∈ P(Γn). For any m ∈ Mn and s ∈ Sn, the associated
error probability with respect to Cn is
Em(W
n
s ,Cn) =
∑
γ∈Γn
µn(γ)em
(
Wns , cn(γ)
) (46)
The maximal error probability and SS-metric of Cn for the
Q-constrained AVWTC (Wn,Vn,Q) are defined as
E(Wn,Q,Cn) = max
s∈SnQ,
m∈Mn
Em(W
n
s ,Cn) (47a)
LSem(V
n,Q,Cn) = max
γ∈Γn
ℓSem
(
V
n,Q, cn(γ)
)
= max
γ∈Γn,
s∈SnQ,
PM∈P(Mn)
ℓ
(
V ns , PM , cn(γ)
)
. (47b)
Remark 6 The choice of encoder-decoder in a CR code is
based on a realization of a random experiment that is available
to the transmitted and the legitimate receiver. However, this
CR the legitimate users share should not be viewed as a
cryptographic key to be exploited for secrecy. This is accounted
for in (47b) by requiring that every uncorrelated code in
the family Cn is semantically-secure. The choice of the state
sequence, on the other hand, may depend on the family Cn
and the PMF µn, but not on the realization itself.
Definition 7 (CR-Assisted Achievability) A number R ∈
R+ is called an achievable CR-assisted SS-rate for the Q-
constrained AVWTC (Wn,Vn,Q), if for every ǫ > 0 and
sufficiently large n, there exists a CR (n,Mn,Kn)-code Cn
with
1
n
logMn > R− ǫ (48a)
E(Wn,Q,Cn) ≤ ǫ (48b)
LSem(V
n,Q,Cn) ≤ ǫ. (48c)
Remark 7 Note that if there are no types in Q then any rate
is achievable. Consequently, if Q1 ⊆ Q2 ⊆ P(S), then any
R that is achievable for the Q2-constrained AVWTC is also
achievable for the Q1-constrained AVWTC. The achievable
rates are therefore an increasing set as the constraint set
decreases. When specializing to the type constrained AVWTC,
we allow state sequences with types that are δ-close to the
constraining distribution (see Definition 10). Consequently, the
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set of feasible state sequences is never empty, for large enough
values of n. Nonetheless, the aforementioned monotonicity of
the type constrained CR-assisted capacity still holds.
Remark 8 Our achievability proof shows that
LSem(V
n,Q,Cn) vanishes exponentially fast. This is a
standard requirement in cryptography, commonly referred to
as strong-SS (see, e.g., [39, Section 3.2]).
Definition 8 (CR-Assisted Capacity) The CR-assisted SS-
capacity CR(W,V,Q) of the Q-constrained AVWTC is the
supremum of the set of achievable CR-assisted SS-rates.
Our main goal is solving the type constrained AVWTC
(Wn,Vn, QS), for QS ∈ Pn(S). However, since a fixed ratio-
nal distribution QS is not a valid type for all blocklengths, the
definitions of the type constrained performance metrics and its
achievability use a relaxation parameter. For any QS ∈ P(S)
and δ > 0, let Qδ(QS) ,
{
νs ∈ Pn(S)
∣∣∣s ∈ T nδ (QS)}. The
definitions of the error probability and the SS-metric for the
type constrained AVWTC repeat those from Definition 6 with
Qδ(QS) instead of Q.
Definition 9 (Type Constrained Error Probability & SS)
For any QS ∈ P(S) and δ > 0, the maximal error
probability and SS-metric of a CR (n,Mn,Kn)-code Cn for
the type constrained AVWTC (Wn,Vn, QS) with relaxation
δ are E
(
Wn,Qδ(QS),Cn
)
and LSem
(
Vn,Qδ(QS),Cn
)
,
respectively (see (47)).
Definition 10 (Type Constrained Achievability & Capacity)
A number R ∈ R+ is called an achievable CR-assisted SS-
rate for the type constrained AVWTC (Wn,Vn, QS), if there
exists a δ > 0 such that for every ǫ > 0 and sufficiently large
n, there exists a CR (n,Mn,Kn)-code Cn with
1
n
logMn > R− ǫ (49a)
E
(
W
n,Qδ(QS),Cn
)
≤ ǫ (49b)
LSem
(
V
n,Qδ(QS),Cn
)
≤ ǫ. (49c)
The CR-assisted SS-capacity CR(W,V, QS) of the type con-
strained AVWTC (Wn,Vn, QS) is the supremum of the set of
achievable CR-assisted SS-rates.
Remark 9 The definition of type constrained achievability
allows the empirical PMFs of the state sequences to be within
a δ > 0 gap from QS . By doing so, the type constrained
AVWTC is well-defined for all sufficiently large blocklengths
n ∈ N, even when QS is not actually a type but a PMF on S.
Remark 10 If R is an achievable CR-assisted SS-rate for
the type constrained AVWTC (Wn,Vn, QS) and δ > 0
is its corresponding parameter, then (49b)-(49c) also hold
for any δ′ ∈ (0, δ). This implies that CR(W,V, QS) =
sup
δ>0
CR
(
W,V,Qδ(QS)
)
.
B. Single-Letter CR-Capacity Results
Our main result is a single-letter characterization of the CR-
assisted SS-capacity CR(W,V, QS) of the type constrained
AVWTC (Wn,Vn, QS), for any QS ∈ P(S). A multi-letter
characterization of the CR-assisted strong secrecy-capacity of
the AVWTC without constraints on the state sequences was
found in [25]. The uncorrelated secrecy-capacity was then
derived in [22] by relating it to the CR-assisted secrecy-
capacity via the corresponding coding result for the classic
AVC [15]. To the best of our knowledge, the only single-letter
characterization of a secrecy-capacity of an AVWTC outside
the current work [21, Theorem 4] is under the following
assumptions: (i) security under the weak secrecy metric (as
shown in [25, Corollary 1] an upgrade to strong secrecy
under the same conditions (ii)-(iv) is possible); (ii) the state
space decomposes as S = Sy × Sz , where sy ∈ Sy and
sz ∈ Sz are the states of the main AVC and of the AVC to the
eavesdropper, respectively; (iii) the eavesdroppers output is a
degraded version of the output of the main AVC under any
pair of state, i.e., X − Ysy − Zsz forms a Markov chain, for
all (sy, sz) ∈ Sy × Sz; (iv) there exists a best channel to the
eavesdropper, i.e., the exists s⋆z ∈ Sz such that X−Zs⋆z −Zsz
forms a Markov chain, for all sz ∈ Sz .8
Our single-letter CR-capacity characterization is derived
without assuming any of the above, while upgrading the
secrecy metric to SS. Constrained state sequences were con-
sidered in the context of the classic point-to-point (PTP) AVC
and the corresponding CR-assisted and uncorrelated capacities
were derived in [36] and [23], respectively. An AVWTC with
linear peak constraints on the input and the state sequences
was studied in [37], where a multi-letter description of its
CR-assisted strong secrecy-capacity was found.
Theorem 1 (AVWTC CR-Assisted SS-Capacity) For any
QS ∈ P(S), the CR-assisted SS-capacity of the type
constrained AVWTC (Wn,Vn, QS) is
CR(W,V, QS) = max
QU,X
[
I(U ;Y )− I(U ;Z|S)
]
, (50)
where the mutual information terms are calculated with
respect to a joint PMF QU,XQSQY |X,SQZ|X,S with
QY |X,S(y|x, s) = Ws(y|x) and QZ|X,S(z|x, s) = Vs(z|x),
for all (s, x, y, z) ∈ S × X × Y × Z , and |U| ≤ |X |.
Theorem 1 is a consequence of two other stronger results
that state a lower and upper bound on the CR-assisted SS-
capacity of a general Q-constrained AVWTC. These bounds
match when specialized to the type constrained scenario. The
lower and upper bounds are given in Theorem 2 and 3,
respectively. Theorem 1 is proven in Section IV-E.
Remark 11 (SS-Capacity Interpretation) The character-
ization of the CR-assisted SS-capacity CR(W,V, QS) in
(50) has the common structure of two subtracted mutual
8An even stronger version of assumptions (iii) and (iv) was used in [21].
Specifically, the degraded property and the existence of a best channel to the
eavesdropper were assumed to hold not only for every pair of original states,
but also for any pair of averaged states (defined as convex combinations of
the original ones).
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information terms. The first term, which corresponds to the
capacity of the main channel, suggests that the legitimate users
effectively see the averaged DMC WQ : X → P(Y) defined
by WQ(y|x) ,
∑
s∈S QS(s)Ws(y|x). In general, the capacity
of the averaged channel is no larger than the capacities of
the main channels Ws associated with each s ∈ S. Namely,
denoting the capacity of a PTP channel W : X → P(Y) by
C(W ), it holds that C(WQ) ≤ mins∈S C(Ws). This is due
to the convexity of the mutual information in the conditional
PMF (for a fixed marginal) and Jensen’s inequality.
The second (subtracted) mutual information term is the
loss in capacity induced by the secrecy requirement. The
independence of U and S allows one to rewrite the conditional
mutual information as I(U ;S,Z), which implies that security
must be ensured versus an eavesdropper with perfect CSI.
Remark 12 (Relation to the IID State Scenario) The for-
mula in (50) can be viewed as the secrecy-capacity of the WTC
with state variables that are i.i.d. according to QS , when no
CSI is available to the legitimate users while the eavesdropper
has full CSI. For simplicity, we outline a proof of this claim
under the strong secrecy metric; an upgrade to SS is possible
by means of the Lemma 1 herein. The direct part follows by
constructing a classic WTC code using i.i.d. samples of a
random variable U ∼ QU that is independent of S ∼ QS .
Setting the total number of codewords just below 2nI(U ;Y )
ensures reliable decoding, while strong secrecy follows by
standard soft-covering arguments as long as each subcode-
book has a rate that is at least I(U ;Z, S) (see, [47, Corollay
VII.5]). The converse essentially follows by repeating the steps
between Equations (134)-(138) from Section VI, while omitting
the conditioning on the random variable Cn in (134).
Remark 13 (Cardinality Bound) The cardinality bound on
U in Theorem 1 is established using a standard application of
the Eggleston-Fenchel-Carathe´odory Theorem [51, Theorem
18]. The details are omitted.
We have the following lower bound on the CR-assisted SS-
capacity of a Q-constrained AVWTC.
Theorem 2 (Achievability with Q-constrained States)
For any convex and closed Q ⊆ P(S), the CR-assisted
SS-capacity of the Q-constrained AVWTC (Wn,Vn,Q) is
lower bounded as
CR(W,V,Q) ≥ max
QU,X
[
min
Q
(1)
S
∈Q
I(U ;Y )− max
Q
(2)
S
∈Q
I(U ;Z|S)
]
,
(51)
where the mutual information terms are calculated with re-
spect to joint PMFs QU,XQ(j)S QY |X,SQZ|X,S , for j = 1, 2,
with QY |X,S(y|x, s) = Ws(y|x) and QZ|X,S(z|x, s) =
Vs(z|x), for all (s, x, y, z) ∈ S ×X ×Y ×Z , and |U| ≤ |X |.
The proof of Theorem 2 is given in Section V. It relies
on the approach from [36] for the error probability analysis
of a CR-code over a family of codes that grows doubly-
exponentially with the blocklength. Since this family of codes
is too large to establish SS in the sense of (47b), we use the
Chernoff bound to show that a sub-family with no more than
polynomially many codes is sufficient for reliability. Having
that, the double-exponential decay that Lemma 1 provides is
leveraged to establish SS over the reduced CR-code. The fact
that reliability and security must hold with respect to the worst
case choice in Q is expressed in the minimization of I(U ;Y )
over all Q(1)S PMFs and the maximization of I(U ;Z|S) over
Q
(2)
S .
Although no converse proof accompanies Theorem 2, the
lower bound it states is stronger than existing single-letter
achievability results in the literature as it assumes no ‘best
channel to the eavesdropper’, doesn’t impose any specific
structure on the state space, and ensures SS.
Remark 14 (AVWTC Main Challenges) The difficulty in
obtaining single-letter results for the AVWTC is twofold. First,
the AVWTC must (in particular) satisfy all the performance
requirements of the compound WTC (where the channel re-
mains constant throughout the block transmission). The second
difficulty is in ensuring security under exponentially many
possible state sequences. Setting sights on single-letter results,
the common workaround for the latter problem is to assume
the existence of ‘a best channel to the eavesdropper’. Formally,
it means that there exists a PMF Q⋆ ∈ P(S), such that the
averaged channel
∑
s∈S Q
⋆(s)Vs(y|x) is better than all other
averaged channels in the sense that the corresponding outputs
form a Markov chain with the channel input X . Secrecy
is then guaranteed with respect to this ‘best channel’ only.
As Theorem 2 is derived without any assumptions on the
AVWTC, it highlights the strength of Lemma 1 in proving that
exponentially many secrecy constraints (strongly related to the
soft-covering phenomenon) are simultaneously satisfied, while
only single-letter rate bounds are needed.
Remark 15 (Relation to Compound WTCs) Theorem 2 es-
tablishes that the AVWTC is no worse than the best known
single-letter secrecy rates for the compound WTC. Take the
Q-constrained AVWTC from Theorem 2 with some convex and
closed Q ⊆ P(S). Consider a compound WTC derived from
this AVWTC. The state of the compound WTC is any point
QS ∈ Q. The compound WTC itself follows the probability
law of the AVWTC, with the arbitrarily varying state Sn
replaced by an i.i.d. state according to QS and the Sn
sequence included in the channel output to the eavesdropper.
For this compound WTC, the RHS of (51) coincides with the
sharpest single-letter lower bound on the secrecy-capacity of
the compound WTC in the literature (see [29, Theorem 1] and
[33, Theorem 3.6]).
A general upper bound on the CR-assisted SS-capacity of
a Q-constrained AVWTC is given next. To state the result,
for any countable alphabet X we defined PQ(X ) as the set of
rational PMFs on X . Namely,
PQ(X ) ,
{
P ∈ P(X )
∣∣∣P (x) ∈ Q, ∀x ∈ X}. (52)
Theorem 3 (Upper Bound with Q-constrained States)
For any Q ⊆ P(S), the CR-assisted SS-capacity of the
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Q-constrained AVWTC (Wn,Vn,Q) is upper bounded as
CR(W,V,Q)
≤ max
QV,U,X
inf
QS∈Q∩PQ(S)
[
I(U ;Y |V )− I(U ;S,Z|V )
]
, (53)
where the mutual information terms are calculated with
respect to a joint PMF QV,U,XQSQY |X,SQZ|X,S with
QY |X,S(y|x, s) = Ws(y|x) and QZ|X,S(z|x, s) = Vs(z|x),
for all (s, x, y, z) ∈ S × X × Y × Z . Furthermore, one may
restrict |U| ≤ |X | and |V| ≤ |X |2 − 1.
The proof of Theorem 3 is given in Section VI. The max-
inf structure of the RHS of (53) calls for a derivation that is
uniform in QS ∈ Q. The infimum is taken over Q ∩ PQ(S)
(rather than over Q) because the proof effectively considers
only the rational distributions in Q while leveraging the
monotonicity of the CR-assisted SS-capacity with respect to Q
(see Remark 7). The proof relies on a novel argument based on
distribution coupling. We show that for each QS ∈ Q∩PQ(S),
reliability and SS under a type constraint QS imply similar
performance for the same channel but where the state sequence
is i.i.d. according to QS . The main difficulty is in showing that
even when transmitting over a DMC obtained by averaging the
Ws ∈W with respect to QS , the normalized equivocation of
the message given the output sequence at the legitimate user
is still small.
Usually, Fano’s inequality is sufficient for 1nH(M |Y
n) to
become arbitrarily small with n. This, however, is not the case
here. The reliability criterion from (48b) and Fano’s inequality
imply that maxs∈SnQ
1
nH(M |Y
n
s ) is small, but Theorem 3
needs this to hold for 1nH(M |Y
n). In general, the former
must not imply the latter because for any s ∈ SnQ, the channel
Ws ∈W is at least as good as WQ, meaning that the averaged
channel induces a possibly larger equivocation. We establish
the desired convergence of the equivocation at the legitimate
receiver by a continuity property which we derive via the
coupling idea.
Remark 16 (Relation to the Converse of Theorem 1) The
converse for Theorem 1 is derived based on Theorem 3. Since
the latter is valid for any Q ⊂ P(S), combining it with
basic continuity arguments implies the optimality of the RHS
of (50). However, Theorem 3 encapsulates an even stronger
claim: the RHS of (50) is the best achievable CR-assisted
SS-rate even if the state sequence is constrained to a single
type (that potentially might allows higher rates), rather than
a vanishing typical set.
Although clearly sufficient, the strong claim of Theorem
3 is not necessary for the converse of Theorem 1. In fact,
one can circumvent the main difficulty in proving Theorem
3 (as described above), by establishing the optimality of the
RHS of (50) based on arguments similar to those used for
the converse of the classic AVC with constrained states [14,
Lemma 3.2]. Specifically, the probability of a decoding error
under a random state sequence that is i.i.d. according to QS
can be shown to be small simply by splitting the analysis
to typical and atypical state sequences. The definition of
the type constrained CR-assisted achievability (Definition 10),
that accounts for a typical set around QS , takes care of the
typical part, while the atypical part is bounded above by the
exponentially decaying probability of the atypical set. Having
that, a standard application of Fano’s inequality implies that
1
nH(M |Y
n) converges to 0 with the blocklength, as required.
This simple argument, however, does not apply when there is
an actual type constraint (rather than a typical set constraint)
on the state sequences. This is because for any QS ∈ Pn(S),
the probability of an i.i.d. QS sequence of states not being
in T nQS approaches 1 when n grows. As a consequence, the
corresponding decoding error probability might not be small.
The proof of Theorem 3 does not directly deals with the error
probability. Instead, the aforementioned distribution coupling
arguments and continuity of entropy are used to show that
the normalized equivocation converges for state sequences in
the entire typical set, as long as it converges for at least one
specific type in that typical set. Although the proof Theorem 3
is cumbersome and requires several non-trivial steps, we take
this route (rather than a converse tailored for Theorem 1) due
to the stronger and insightful claim it produces.
Remark 17 (Time-Sharing Random Variable V ) The
conditioning on V in the RHS of (53) effectively allows
the legitimate user to choose a random mixture of QU,X
distributions. The advantage in doing so is that there might
not exist a single state distribution that is bad for the whole
mixture. This is reminiscent of a two-player zero-sum game,
where the player who fixes the strategy first often benefits from
a mixed strategy. When specializing to the type constrained
scenario, however, the time-sharing random variable is
removed. This is since when only one state distribution is
allowed, the aforementioned distribution mixing outcomes
with no gain.
Remark 18 (Relation to Compound WTCs) The best pre-
viously known single-letter upper bound on the secrecy-
capacity of the compound WTC is due to Liang et al. [29,
Theorem 2]. That upper bound has a min-max structure, and
it is derived by claiming that the secrecy-capacity of the
compound WTC is bounded above by that of the worst WTC in
the set. This type of bounds are commonly related to knowledge
of the channel’s state at the transmitter (cf. e.g., [52]). Indeed,
as shown in [33], the upper bound from [29] is tight for the
compound WTC with encoder CSI.
Specializing the max-inf upper bound from Theorem 3
to the compound WTC described in Remark 15 (i.e., over
an appropriate constraint set), results in a strengthening of
the claim from [29, Theorem 2]. The obtained bound first
minimizes the difference of mutual information terms from the
RHS of (53) over the constraint set, and then maximizes the
outcome over the input distribution. It is easily observed the
difference between the two bounds can be strict. In fact, for
the special case of a PTP compound channel (i.e., without
an eavesdropper) our bound is the actual capacity, while the
bound from [29] is loose. A simple example is a channel that
consists of two orthogonal binary channels: one is noise free
while the other one is purely noise (i.e., binary symmetric
channel with crossover probability 12 ). The state determines
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which channel is noisy, and the transmitter selects a binary
input, which is unknown to the receiver, specifying which
channel to use (both channels give an output each time,
with one being pure noise). For this instance, the compound
capacity is 12 [bit/use], but the looser min-max bound gives 1
[bit/use].
Theorem 3 essentially says that the Q-constrained AVWTC
is no better than the compound WTC under the corresponding
constraints. Although this point seems intuitively obvious, it
actually requires some careful attention. At first glance, the
compound channel (on a constraint set) seems like an AVWTC
with a stricter restriction on the eavesdropper, that now must
choose an i.i.d. state sequence from the constraint set (rather
than an arbitrary one). However, this perspective is misleading
since the i.i.d. state sequence might not fall within the type
constraint, especially when dealing with a single type.
Remark 19 (Cardinality Bound) The cardinality bound on
U and V in Theorem 3 follow by applying the Eggleston-
Fenchel-Carathe´odory Theorem [51, Theorem 18] twice. The
details are omitted.
A simple consequence of Theorem 3 is the following.
Corollary 1 (Upper Bound when Q is Open) If
Q ⊆ P(S) is an open set, then the CR-assisted SS-
capacity of the Q-constrained AVWTC (Wn,Vn,Q) is upper
bounded as
CR(W,V,Q) ≤ max
QV,U,X
inf
QS∈Q
[
I(U ;Y |V )− I(U ;Z|S, V )
]
,
(54)
where joint PMF is as described in Theorem 3.
When Q is an open set, the domain of the infimum requires
no intersection with PQ(S). This essentially follows because
the rational numbers are dense in the reals and the mutual
information is continuous in the underlying distribution. The
full details are omitted.
C. An Example
We give a simple numerical example that visualizes the SS-
capacity result of Theorem 1. Let X = Y = {0, 1} and Z =
{0, 1, ?}, where ? is an erased symbol. Further assume that the
state space S decomposes as S = S1×S2, where Sj = {0, 1},
for j = 1, 2. Let (W,V) be an AVWTC, where the elements of
W and V are indexed by s1 ∈ S1 and s2 ∈ S2, respectively.
Define the main channel Ws1 : X → P(Y), for s1 ∈ S1,
as Ws1(y|x) = 1{y=x⊕s1}, where ⊕ denotes the modulo 2
addition. For the eavesdropper, let V0 : X → P(Z) be a
noiseless channel, while V1 : X → P(Z) outputs the symbol
? with probability 1. Namely,
Vs2(z|x) =
{
1{z=x}, s2 = 0
1{z=?}, s2 = 1
. (55)
Finally, we introduce a type constraint QS1,S2 = QS1QS2 on
the state sequences, where QS1(1) = ǫ and QS2(1) = α, for
some ǫ ∈
[
0, 12
]
and α ∈ [0, 1]. Denote the CR-assisted SS-
capacity of this AVWTC by CR(ǫ, α).
By Theorem 1, The CR-assisted SS-capacity is
CR(ǫ, α) = max
QU,X
[
I(U ;Y )− I(U ;Z|S2)
]
, (56)
where the mutual information terms are cal-
culated with respect to the joint distribution
QS1(s1)QS2(s2)QU,X(u, x)Ws1 (y|x)Vs2 (z|x).
Note that for any QU,X ∈ P(U × X ), we have
I(U ;Z|S2)
= QS2(0)I(U ;Z|S2 = 0) +QS2(1)I(U ;Z|S2 = 1)
(a)
= (1− α)I(U ;X), (57)
where (a) is because Z =? whenever S2 = 1 (thus nullifying
the second mutual information term), while given on S2 = 0,
we have Z = X and the conditioning is removed due to the
independence of S2 and (U,X). Consequently, (56) reduces
to
CR(ǫ, α) = max
QU,X
[
I(U ;Y )− (1− α)I(U ;X)
]
, (58)
which is calculated with respect to
QS1(s1)QU,X(u, x)Ws1 (y|x). Now, since S1 does not
appear in any of the mutual information terms, their value
remains unchanged if the above joint distribution is replaced
with QU,X(u, x)WQ1(y|x), where WQ1 : X → P(Y) is
the average DMC WQ1 (y|x) =
∑
s1∈S1 QS1(s1)Ws1(y|x)(see Remark 11). Noting that the DMC WQ1 is a binary
symmetric channel with crossover probability ǫ (BSC(ǫ)), we
have that CR(ǫ, α) is the secrecy-capacity of BS-BE WTC
with a BSC(ǫ) between the legitimate users and a binary
erasure channel with erasure probability α (BEC(α)) to the
eavesdropper [38].
Remark 20 Interestingly, (58) is also the SS-capacity of the
WTC of type II (WTCII) with a BSC(ǫ) to the legitimate
user and an eavesdropper who can actively choose any
⌊n(1 − α)⌋ of the transmitted symbols to observe. [50].
This is not surprising since the WTCII with a noisy main
channel is a particular instance of a type constrained AVWTC.
Consequently, its SS-capacity (stated in Theorem 3 of [50]) is
recovered from Theorem 1 by steps similar to those presented
between Equations (56)-(58). Namely, this is done by letting
the AVC between the legitimate users be a DMC and treating
the eavesdropper’s AVC as in (57). In fact, the type constrained
AVWTC captures as a special case also the generalization of
the WTCII from [53], where the subset of symbols chosen by
the eavesdropper is further corrupted by noise (i.e., by passing
it through another DMC). The only actual difference between
these WTCII models and the AVWTC is that the main channel
in the formers is a DMC (and not an AVC), which makes CR-
assisted codes unnecessary. However, this is the case for any
AVWTC with a main DMC.
Fig. 3 depicts the CR-assisted SS-capacity of the considered
AVWTC as a function of type constraints on the main and on
the eavesdropper’s channels. The variation of CR(ǫ, α) as a
function of QS1(1) = ǫ for a fixed α = 0.4 is shown in Fig.
3(a), while Fig. 3(b) presents the SS-capacity as a function of
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R∗S(W,V) , lim
k→∞
1
k
sup
P
V¯k,X¯
k∈P(Vk×X k)
[
min
Q∈P(S)
IP (Q)
(
V¯k; Y¯
k
Q
)
− max
sk∈Sk
IP (Q)
(
V¯k; Z¯
k
sk
)] (59)
P
(Q)
V¯k,X¯k,Y¯ kQ ,Z¯
k
sk
(vk, x
k, yk, zk) = PV¯k,X¯k
(
vk, x
k
) k∏
i=1
(∑
s∈S
Q(s)Ws(yi|xi)
)
Vsi(zi|xi) (60)
R∗S(W,V, QS) , lim
n→∞
1
nℓ
sup
P
V¯nℓ,X¯
nℓ∈P(Vnℓ×Xnℓ)
[
IP
(
V¯nℓ; Y¯
nℓ
QS
)
− max
snℓ∈T nℓQS
IP
(
V¯nℓ; Z¯
nℓ
snℓ
)]
, (61)
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Fig. 3: CR-assisted SS-capacity CR(ǫ, α) versus: (a) the
proscribed type for the main channel QS1(1) = ǫ, which
corresponds to the portion of flipped symbols in the BS-BE
WTC; (b) the proscribed type for the eavesdropper’s channel
QS2(1) = α, which corresponds to the portion of erasures in
the BS-BE WTC.
QS2(1) = α when ǫ = 0.1 is fixed. The curves are plotted by
parametrizing the joint PMF of the binary random variables
U and X and spanning over the possible probability values.
As mentioned before, CR(ǫ, α) is also the secrecy-capacity of
a BS-BE WTC.
This WTC was studied in [38], where it was shown that
the secrecy-capacity is zero if α < 4ǫ(1 − ǫ). When ǫ = 0.1
the threshold value of α is 0.36. Indeed, Fig. 3(b) reveals
that CR(0.1, α) = 0 for any α < 0.36. Beyond 0.36, the SS-
capacity monotonically increases with α, since the larger the
probability of an erasure, the worse the channel to the eaves-
dropper is. From the opposite perspective, a fixed α = 0.4
induces two real solutions to the equation 0.4 = 4ǫ(1 − ǫ),
which are ǫ1 ≈ 0.1127 and ǫ2 ≈ 0.8872. The condition
0.4 < 4ǫ(1 − ǫ) is then satisfied for any ǫ ∈ (ǫ1, ǫ2), which
gives a zero SS-capacity in that region in Fig. 3(b). Also
observe that as a function of ǫ, CR(ǫ, 0.4) grows as the
crossover probability approaches the extreme values of 0 or 1.
D. Relation Between Theorem 1 and the Multi-Letter CR-
Assisted Secrecy-Capacity Characterization
We compare the single-letter result of Theorem 1 to the
multi-letter description of the secrecy-capacity as derived in
[25]. Reciting the result of [25], the (strong) secrecy-capacity
of an AVWTC (W,V) with unconstrained states is given in
(59) at the top of this page9, where the subscript P indicates
that the mutual information terms are calculated with respect
to a joint distribution that for each k ∈ N, Q ∈ P(S) and
sk ∈ Sk, is given by (60) and the cardinality of Vk is bounded
above as |Vk| ≤ |X |k .
To adapt R∗S(W,V) to the type constrained AVWTC
(W,V, QS), for QS ∈ PQ(S) (see (52)), we first account
for the fact that T kQS is empty for several values of k ∈ N.
Denote the non-zero entries of QS by QS(s) = asbs , where
s ∈ supp(QS), and define ℓ = lcm{bs}s∈supp(QS), where
lcmA, for A ⊂ N with |A| < ∞, is the least common
multiple of the elements in A. Denote Nℓ ,
{
n · ℓ
∣∣n ∈ N}
and henceforth consider only blocklengths that belong to Nℓ.
Having this, the adaptation of R∗S(W,V) to the AVWTC with
a type constraint QS ∈ PQ(S), is given in (61) at the top of
this page, where each PV¯nℓ,X¯nℓ ∈ P(Vnℓ ×X
nℓ) induces the
joint distribution P , P (QS)
V¯nℓ,X¯nℓ,Y¯ nℓQS
,Z¯nℓ
snℓ
. As a disclaimer, we
remark that the we did not directly prove10 that R∗S(W,V, QS)
is indeed a multi-letter description of the type constrained
AVWTC secrecy-capacity, and we first state it merely as
an educated guess. Nonetheless, as the following proposition
9We use macrons in the following notation of random variables not because
they are multi-dimensions, but to distinguish them from other random variable
that have yet to be introduced.
10By adapting the proof steps from [25].
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R∗S(W,V, QS) = lim
k→∞:
k∈Nℓ
1
k
sup
P
V¯k,X¯
k∈P(Vk×X k)
[
IPˆ
(
Vk;Y
k
)
− max
sk∈T kQS
IPˆ
(
Vk;Z
k
∣∣Sk = sk)
]
. (68)
shows, this is actually the case since R∗S(W,V, QS) is equal
to the CR-assisted SS-capacity formula from Theorem 1.
Proposition 1 (Multi-Letter CR-Assisted SS-Capacity)
For any QS ∈ PQ(S) it holds that
R∗S(W,V, QS) = CR(W,V, QS). (62)
Proof: We first show that R∗S(W,V, QS) ≥
CR(W,V, QS). Let Q¯U,X ∈ P(U × X ) be the extremum
achieving distributions in CR(W,V, QS), and denote
Q¯ , Q¯U,XQSQY |X,SQZ|X,S , where QY |X,S and QZ|X,S
are defined in Theorem 1. For each n ∈ N and snℓ ∈ T nℓQS ,
denote k = nℓ and define
P¯ U¯k,X¯k,Y¯ kQS ,Z¯
k
sk
(uk, xk, yk, zk)
,
k∏
i=1
Q¯U,X(ui, xi)WQS (yi|xi)Vsi(zi|xi), (63)
where WQS : X → P(Y) is given by WQS (y|x) =∑
s∈S QS(s)Ws(y|x). We abbreviate P¯U¯k,X¯k,Y¯ kQS ,Z¯ksk as P¯
and note that it corresponds to taking Vk = Uk and setting
PV¯k,X¯k = Q¯
k
U,X in P
(QS)
V¯k,X¯k,Y¯ kQS
,Z¯k
sk
. As a last preliminary
technical step we define (Uk, Xk, Sk, Y k, Zk) as independent
copies of (U,X, S, Y, Z) ∼ Q¯, i.e., (Uk, Xk, Sk, Y k, Zk) ∼
Q¯k, and note that P¯U¯k,X¯k,Y¯ kQS = Q¯
k
U,X,Y and that
P¯U¯k,X¯k,Z¯k
sk
= Q¯kU,X,Z|S=sk , for each s
k ∈ Sk.
Now, evaluating the first mutual information term from (61)
under P¯ gives
IP¯
(
U¯k; Y¯ kQS
)
= IQ¯k(U
k;Y k)
(a)
= k · IQ¯(U ;Y ), (64)
where (a) is because {(Ui, Yi)}ki=1 are a sequence of i.i.d.
pairs according to the marginal distribution of U and Y
with respect to Q¯. For the subtracted term from (61) when
calculated with respect to P¯ , we have
max
sk∈T kQS
IP¯
(
U¯k; Z¯
k
sk
) (a)
= max
sk∈T kQS
IQ¯k(U
k;Zk|Sk = sk)
(b)
= max
sk∈T kQS
k∑
i=1
IQ¯k(Ui;Zi|Si = si)
(c)
= max
sk∈T kQS
k ·
∑
s∈S
QS(s)IQ¯(U ;Z|S = s)
= k · IQ¯(U ;Z|S) (65)
where (a) is because P¯U¯k,X¯k,Z¯k
sk
= Q¯kU,X,Z|S=sk , for every
sk ∈ Sk, (b) uses the product structure of Q¯k, while (c)
follows since νsk = QS for every sk ∈ T kQS .
Based on (64) and (65) we get the desired inequality since
R∗S(W,V, QS)
≥ lim
k→∞:
k∈Nℓ
1
k
[
IP¯
(
U¯k; Y¯ kQS
)
− max
sk∈T k
QS
IP¯
(
U¯k; Z¯ksk
)]
= IQ¯(U ;Y )− IQ¯(U ;Z|S)
= CR(W,V, QS). (66)
The opposite inequality, that is R∗S(W,V, QS) ≤
CR(W,V, QS), follows by repeating the steps from the proof
of Theorem 3 (with the proper update of notation). To avoid
verbatim repetition of the same arguments, we give only an
outline of the proof while describing the required adjustments.
To this end, for each k ∈ Nℓ and PV¯k,X¯k ∈ P(Vk × X
k),
it is convenient to define a new distribution PˆVk,Xk,Sk,Y k,Zk
given by
PˆVk,Xk,Sk,Y k,Zk
(
vk, x
k, sk, yk, zk
)
, PV¯k,X¯k
(
vk, x
k
)
QkS
(
sk
)
W ksk
(
yk
∣∣xk)V ksk(zk∣∣xk). (67)
Noting that PˆVk,Xk,Y k,Zk = PV¯k,X¯k,Y¯ kQS and
PˆVk,Xk,Zk|Sk=sk = PV¯k,X¯k,Z¯k
sk
, for every sk ∈ Sk,
one may rewrite (61) as (68) from the top of this page.
Having this, to establish CR(W,V, QS) as an upper bound,
fix k ∈ Nℓ and PV¯k,X¯k ∈ P(Vk × X
k) and consider the
following. Due to the structure of Pˆ one may treat Vk as the
message M in the proof of Theorem 3 and invoke simple
adaptations of Lemmas 7 and 8 to get
max
sk∈T k
QS
IPˆ
(
Vk;Z
k
∣∣Sk = sk) ≥ IPˆ (Vk;Zk|Sk)−kξk,α, (69)
where ξk,α = log |Z|
(
α+ 2|S|e
−2k α2
|S|2
)
and α is any
number in (0, 1]. Using (69), for any k ∈ Nℓ and PV¯k,X¯k ∈
P(Vk ×X k), we have
IPˆ
(
Vk;Y
k
)
− max
sk∈T k
QS
IPˆ
(
Vk;Z
k
∣∣Sk = sk)
≤ IPˆ
(
Vk;Y
k
)
− IPˆ
(
Vk;Z
k
∣∣Sk)+ kξk,α. (70)
Applying standard manipulations on the RHS of (70) (similar
to those in the derivation of (134)), further shows that
IPˆ
(
Vk;Y
k
)
− max
sk∈T k
QS
IPˆ
(
Vk;Z
k
∣∣Sk = sk)
≤ k · max
QU,X∈P(U×X )
[
IQ(U ;Y )− IQ(U ;Z|S)
]
+ kξk,α,
(71)
where the mutual information terms are taken with respect
to the joint distribution from Theorem 1. The derivation of
(71) also relies on claims similar to those from Lemmas 10
and 11 from Section VI. Dividing both sides by k, taking the
supremum of the LHS over all PV¯k,X¯k ∈ P(Vk × X
k) and
replacing α ∈ (0, 1] with a sequence
{
αk
}
k∈Nℓ that decays
sufficiently slowly to zero, the proof is completed by letting
k →∞.
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E. Proof of Theorem 1 from Theorems 2 and 3
Achievability: For the direct part, denote the RHS of (50)
by C⋆R(W,V, QS) and assume that R < C⋆R(W,V, QS). We
show that there exists δ0 > 0, such that for any ǫ > 0 there is
a CR (n,Mn,Kn)-code Cn that satisfies (49).
For any δ > 0, define
Pδ(QS),
{
P ∈ P(S)
∣∣∣∣∣P (s)−QS(s)∣∣ ≤ δQS(s), ∀s ∈ S},
(72)
and note that Pδ(QS) is convex and closed. Applying Theorem
2 with Q = Pδ(QS) and recalling Definition 7 of Q-
constrained achievability, yields that if11
R < max
QU,X
[
min
Q1∈Pδ(QS)
IQ1(U ;Y )− max
Q2∈Pδ(QS)
IQ2(U ;Z|S)
]
,
(73)
then there exists a CR (n,Mn,Kn)-code Cn that satisfies (49).
Thus, to establish the achievability of R it suffices to show
that there exists δ0 > 0 for which (73) holds. The following
lemma, that is proven in Appendix A using continuity, fills
that gap.
Lemma 3 The following limiting relation holds:
max
QU,X
[
min
Q1∈Pδ(QS)
IQ1(U ;Y )− max
Q2∈Pδ(QS)
IQ2 (U ;Z|S)
]
ր C⋆R(W,V, QS), (74)
as δ ց 0.
Converse: Assume that R is an achievable CR-assisted SS-
rate for the type constrained AVWTC (Wn,Vn, QS). Then,
there exists δ > 0, such that for all ǫ > 0 and sufficiently
large n, there exists a CR (n,Mn,Kn)-code Cn that satisfies
(49). Define
Rδ(QS) , Pδ(QS) ∩ PQ(S), (75)
(see (52) and (72)) which is the set of all rational PMFs on
S that are element-wise δ-close to QS . Recall the definition
of SnQ from (41), where Q ⊆ P(S) is any subset of PMFs.
Taking Q = Rδ(QS) gives SnQ = T nδ (QS), for any n ∈ N.
Using Theorem 3 with Q = Rδ(QS) gives the following
upper bound:
R ≤ max
QV,U,X
inf
QˆS∈Rδ(QS)
[
IQˆ(U ;Y |V )− IQˆ(U ;S,Z|V )
]
,
(76)
where IQˆ denotes that the mutual information terms
are calculated with respect to the marginals of
QV,U,XQˆSQY |X,SQZ|X,S for some QˆS ∈ Rδ(QS), where
QY |X,S(y|x, s) = Ws(y|x) and QZ|X,S(z|x, s) = Vs(z|x),
for all (s, x, y, z) ∈ S × X × Y × Z .
We first show that any QˆS ∈ Rδ(QS) in the joint
distribution of (V, U,X, S, Y, Z) can be replaced with the
11For simplicity of notation, throughout the proof of Theorem 1 we write
Qj instead of Q(j)S , for j = 1, 2.
QS while causing only a small change in the value of the
mutual information terms. Let Q⋆V,U,X ∈ P(V × U × X )
be the maximizer of the RHS of (76). With some abuse
of notation we denote by IQˆ and IQ a mutual information
term calculated with respect to Q⋆V,U,XQˆSQY |X,SQZ|X,S or
Q⋆V,U,XQSQY |X,SQZ|X,S , respectively. By the definition of
Rδ(QS), for any QˆS ∈ Rδ(QS) we have∣∣QˆS(s)−QS(s)∣∣ ≤ δ
|S|
, ∀s ∈ S. (77)
The continuity of the mutual information implies that there ex-
ists a function f(δ), such that limδ→0 f(δ) = 0 is independent
of Q⋆V,U,X and
IQˆ(U ;Y |V )− IQˆ(U ;S,Z|V )
≤ IQ(U ;Y |V )− IQ(U ;S,Z|V ) + f(δ). (78)
Further notice that Definition 10 of the type constrained
achievability gives
E
(
W
n,Qδ′(QS),Cn
)
≤ ǫ (79a)
LSem
(
V
n,Qδ′(QS),Cn
)
≤ ǫ. (79b)
for any δ′ ∈ (0, δ) (see Remark 10). Taking δ′ → 0 in (78),
while noting that the rational distributions are dense in P(S)
and that IQˆ(U ;Y |V ) − IQˆ(U ;S,Z|V ) is continuous in QˆS
gives
R ≤ IQ(U ;Y |V )− IQ(U ;S,Z|V ). (80)
Our last step is to remove the conditioning on V .
The structure of the joint distribution QV,U,X,S,Y,Z =
QV,U,XQSQY |X,SQZ|X,S implies that for any v ∈ V , the
conditional distribution of (U,X, S, Y, Z) given V = v factors
as QU,X,S,Y,Z|V=v = QU,X|V=vQSQY |X,SQZ|X,S . Denoting
by IQv a mutual information term taken with respect to
QU,X|V=vQSQY |X,SQZ|X,S , we further upper bound R from
(80) as
R ≤ IQ(U ;Y |V )− IQ(U ;S,Z|V )
=
∑
v∈V
QV (v)
[
IQ(U ;Y |V = v)− IQ(U ;S,Z|V = v)
]
≤ max
v∈V
[
IQ(U ;Y |V = v)− IQ(U ;S,Z|V = v)
]
= max
v∈V
[
IQv (U ;Y )− IQv (U ;S,Z)
]
(a)
= max
v∈V
[
IQv (U ;Y )− IQv (U ;Z|S)
]
≤ max
QU,X
[
IQ(U ;Y )− IQ(U ;Z|S)
]
, (81)
where (a) is because U and S are independent under Qv, for
every v ∈ V . This completes the proof.
V. PROOF OF THEOREM 2
The proof first constructs a reliable CR-code over a family
of doubly-exponentially many uncorrelated codes. Specifically,
the family consists of all realizations of a random wiretap
code with i.i.d. codewords. Reliability is then established via
a simple adaptation of the standard AVC error probability
analysis [36]. Being double-exponential in size, however, the
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original family of codes is too large to derive SS in the sense of
(47b). Therefore, a Chernoff bound is used to show that only
a polynomial sub-family of codes is sufficient for reliability,
and having that, the double-exponential decay that Lemma 1
provides is leveraged to prove SS over the reduced CR-code.
Without loss of generality, we assume that Q contains at
least one rational distribution; otherwise, there is nothing to
prove (see Remark 7). Consequently, we henceforth refer only
to blocklengths n ∈ N for which SnQ 6= ∅. We show that (51)
is achievable when U = X . Then, using standard channel
prefixing arguments, the RHS of (51) is achieved.
Fix ǫ > 0, a PMF QU,X ∈ P(U × X ) and let QX be
its marginal on X . For any QS ∈ Q, the joint distribution
of (X,S, Y, Z) is QX,S,Y,Z = QXQSQY |X,SQZ|X,S , where
QY |X,S and QZ|X,S are given in Theorem 2. Since QX ,
QY |X,S and QZ|X,S stay fixed throughout the proof, we use
IQS to denote a mutual information term taken with respect to
QXQSQY |X,SQZ|X,S . Let W be a random variable uniformly
distributed over Wn ,
[
1 : 2nR˜
]
, where R˜ ∈ R+, that is
chosen independently of the message M ; W stands for the
stochastic part of the encoder.
Random Codebook Bn: A random codebook is
a collection of independent random vectors Bn ={
X(m,w)
}
(m,w)∈Mn×Wn , each distributed according to Q
n
X .
Set K˜n = |X |n|Mn||Wn| and index (with respect to some ar-
bitrary order) all possible realizations of Bn by Γ˜n = [1 : K˜n]
to obtain the set of codebooks Bn =
{
B
(γ)
n
}
γ∈Γ˜n
, where
B
(γ)
n =
{
x(m,w, γ)
}
(m,w)∈Mn×Wn is the γ-th element of
Bn. Further, we define the measure µ˜n on Γ˜n as
µ˜n(γ) =
∏
(m,w)∈Mn×Wn
QnX
(
x(m,w, γ)
)
, ∀γ ∈ Γ˜n. (82)
Stochastic Encoder f (n)γ : Fix γ ∈ Γ˜n. To send the message
m ∈ Mn the encoder randomly and uniformly chooses w
from Wn and feeds x(m,w, γ) ∈ B(γ)n into the AVWTC. The
stochastic encoder f (n)γ :Mn → P(Xn) is thus defined by
f (n)γ (x|m) =
∑
w∈Wn
2−nR˜1{
x(m,w,γ)=x
}. (83)
Decoder φ(n)γ : Both m and w are decoded by the legitimate
user. With some abuse of notation, for every γ ∈ Γ˜n we
consider a decoding rule φ(n)γ : Yn →
(
Mn × Wn
)
∪ {e}
that is defined in terms of a non-negative-valued function
d : Xn × Yn → R+ as
φ(n)γ (y) =


(m,w),
max
(m′,w′)∈Mn×Wn:
(m′,w′) 6=(m,w)
d
(
x(m′, w′, γ),y
)
< d
(
x(m,w, γ),y
)
e, no (m,w) as above exists
.
(84)
Although the decoding rule is given in terms of an arbitrary
function d, we soon limit ourselves to a specific choice with
respect to which we establish reliability. We use an arbitrary
d for now to state Lemma 4 in its most general form, thus
emphasizing the generality of this decoding rule.
For every γ ∈ Γ˜n denote c(γ)n ,
(
f
(n)
γ , φ
(n)
γ
)
as the associated uncorrelated (n,Mn)-code, and let
C˜n ,
{
c
(γ)
n
}
γ∈Γ˜n . The CR (n,Mn, K˜n)-code C˜n is thus
defined by the family C˜n, the index set Γ˜n of size K˜n, and the
measure µ˜n ∈ P(Γ˜n) from (82). Note that C˜n is a CR-code
over a family of doubly-exponentially many (n,Mn)-codes.
Error Probability Analysis: We first show the C˜n is
reliable. Having that, we use a Chernoff bound to reduce
our CR-code to be only polynomial (with the blocklength)
in size and then establish SS. The reliability of C˜n relies on
the following lemma, which is effectively an adaptation of [49,
Lemma 12.9]. For completeness, we prove the lemma is given
in Appendix B.
Lemma 4 If EQn
X
d(X,y) ≤ 1, for all y ∈ Yn, then for every
channel Wn : Xn → P(Yn), η > 0 and (m,w) ∈Mn×Wn,
we have
Em,w(Wn, C˜n) ≤ PQn
X
Wn
(
d(X,Y) <
|Mn||Wn|
η
)
+ η,
(85)
where
Em,w(Wn, C˜n) =
∑
γ∈Γ˜n
µ˜n(γ)
∑
y∈Yn:
φ(n)γ (y) 6=(m,w)
Wn
(
y
∣∣x(m,w, γ))
(86)
is the expected error probability in decoding (m,w) over the
ensemble C˜n.
Assume without loss of generality that all entries of the
matrices W ∈ W are bounded below by a positive constant
υ > 0. Indeed, consider a modified family of channels Wυ ,
formally defined by Wυ(y|x) = (1−υ|Y|)W (y|x)+υ, where
W ∈W. Replacing W with Wυ causes a negligible change in
I(U ;Y )− I(U ;Z|S) if υ is small, for any QSQU,X . Further,
any sequence of CR codes that is reliable with respect to Wυ
is trivially modified at the decoder to give the same maximal
error probability under W as the original one did for Wυ . The
modified decoder simulates the output of the AVC W to look
as if it was generated by Wυ . Specifically, upon observing an
output sequence y ∈ Y generated by W, for each time instance
i ∈ [1 : n], the modified decoder draws a Bernoulli
(
υ|Y|
)
distributed random variable: If the outcome is 0, then the
observed yi is preserved. If, on the other hand, the outcome is
1, the new decoder draws a symbol y uniformly from Y and
replaces the observed yi with the uniformly chosen symbol.
This makes the new y-sequence look like it was generated by
the AVC Wυ , and the original decoder is then used.
Our next steps up until Lemma 5 (included) follow close
resemblance to [49, Lemma 12.10]. For any Q ∈ P(S) define
WQ : X → P(Y), the averaged DMC under Q, as
WQ(y|x) ,
∑
s∈S
Q(s)Ws(y|x), ∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y. (87)
Let Q˜ ∈ Q be a minimizer of minQ∈Q IQ(X ;Y ) and set
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d : Xn × Yn → R+ as
d(x,y) =
Wn
Q˜
(y|x)
Q˜nY (y)
=
n∏
i=1
WQ˜(yi|xi)
Q˜Y (yi)
, (88)
for all (x,y) ∈ Xn × Yn with Q˜nY (y) 6= 0, where
Q˜Y (y) =
∑
x∈X
QX(x)WQ˜(y|x). (89)
If Q˜nY (y) = 0, set d(x,y) = 1, for all x ∈ Xn. Clearly
EQn
X
d(X,y) = 1, ∀y ∈ Yn. (90)
Lemma 4 implies that for every η > 0, s ∈ Sn and (m,w) ∈
M×W ,
Em,w(W
n
s ,C˜n)≤PQnXWns
(
Wn
Q˜
(Ys|X)
Q˜nY (Ys)
<
2|Mn||Wn|
η
)
+
η
2
,
(91)
where (X,Ys) ∼ QnXWns .
Fix s ∈ Sn and define the random variable Ln(X,Ys) ,
log
Wn
Q˜
(Ys|X)
Q˜nY (Ys)
. Observe that
EQn
X
Wn
s
Ln(X,Ys)
=
∑
(x,y)∈Xn×Yn
QnX(x)W
n
s (y|x) log
(
n∏
i=1
WQ˜(yi|xi)
Q˜Y (yi)
)
=
n∑
i=1
∑
(x,y)∈X×Y
QX(x)Wsi (y|x) log
(
WQ˜(y|x)
Q˜Y (y)
)
. (92)
For any s ∈ Sn and (x, y) ∈ X × Y , denote
n∑
i=1
Wsi (y|x) = n
∑
s∈S
νs(s)Ws(y|x) , nWνs(y|x), (93)
where νs is the empirical PMF of s, as defined in (2).
Consequently, we have
EQn
X
Wn
s
Ln(X,Ys)
= n ·
∑
(x,y)∈X×Y
QX(x)Wνs (y|x) log
(
WQ˜(y|x)
Q˜Y (y)
)
. (94)
We next show that if s ∈ SnQ, then the RHS of (94) is lower
bounded by IQ˜(X ;Y ).
Lemma 5 For any Q ∈ Q, the following relation holds
∑
(x,y)∈X×Y
QX(x)WQ(y|x) log
(
WQ˜(y|x)
Q˜Y (y)
)
≥ IQ˜(X ;Y ).
(95)
Lemma 5 is proven in Appendix C. Now, if s ∈ SnQ, then
νs ∈ Q. By Lemma 5 and (94) this gives
EQn
X
Wn
s
Ln(X,Ys) ≥ nIQ˜(X ;Y ), ∀s ∈ S
n
Q. (96)
Furthermore, since Ws(y|x) > υ > 0 for every (s, x, y) ∈
S × X × Y , it holds that∣∣∣∣log WQ˜(y|x)Q˜Y (y)
∣∣∣∣ ≤
∣∣∣∣log 1υ
∣∣∣∣ = − log υ, (97)
which implies that∣∣∣∣log WQ˜(Y |X)Q˜Y (Y )
∣∣∣∣ ≤ − log υ (98)
is true with probability 1, for any (X,Y ) ∼ PX,Y ∈ P(X ×
Y). This yields
var
(
log
WQ˜(Y |X)
Q˜Y (Y )
)
≤ log2 υ. (99)
Having (91), (96) and (99), the proof of reliability is
concluded as follows. Recall that Mn = [1 : Mn] and set
Mn =
⌊
2(minQ∈Q IQ(X;Y )−R˜−
δ
2 )
⌋
, (100)
for some δ > 0 to be specified later. Using (91) with ηn = 1n
in the role of η, we have that for n sufficiently large and all
(m,w) ∈Mn ×Wn and s ∈ SnQ, we have
Em,w(W
n
s , C˜n)
≤ PQn
X
Wn
s
(
Wn
Q˜
(Ys|X)
Q˜nY (Ys)
<
2|Mn||Wn|
ηn
)
+
ηn
2
= PQn
X
Wn
s
(
Ln(X,Ys) < log |Mn||Wn| − log
ηn
2
)
+
ηn
2
(a)
≤ PQn
X
Wn
s
(
Ln(X,Ys)<nIQ˜(X ;Y )−
nδ
2
− log
ηn
2
)
+
ηn
2
(b)
≤ PQn
X
Wn
s
(∣∣ELn(X,Ys)− Ln(X,Ys)∣∣ > nδ
2
)
+
ηn
2
(c)
≤
4var
(
Ln(X,Ys)
)
n2δ2
+
ηn
2
(d)
≤
4 log2 υ
nδ2
+
ηn
2
(e)
=
cδ,ν
n
(101)
where (a) and (b) use (100) and (96), respectively, (c) is
Chebyshev’s inequality, (d) follows by the pairwise indepen-
dence of (X,Ys) across time and (99), while (e) is by setting
cδ,ν =
1
2 +
4 log2 υ
δ2 . Concluding, (101) yields
max
s∈SnQ,
(m,w)∈Mn×Wn
Em,w(W
n
s , C˜n) ≤
cδ,ν
n
, (102)
which implies the reliability of CR-code C˜n.
CR Reduction for Reliability: Our next step is to re-
duce the CR-code C˜n over the family C˜n of size K˜n =
|X |n|Mn||Wn|, to be over a family of codes that is no more
than polynomial in size (see [12] for Ahlswede’s original CR
elimination argument for the classic AVC). This reduction
is crucial for the subsequent security analysis. To do so, let{
Gk
}Kn
k=1
be a collection of Kn ∈ N i.i.d. random variables
with values in Γ˜n and a common distribution µ˜n. Each
realization γk ∈ Γ˜n of Gk, k ∈ [1 : Kn], corresponds to a
codebook B(γ)n ∈ Bn which, in turn, induces a code c(γ)n .
We show that averaging the error probabilities associated
with each random code Cn(k) , c(Gk)n results in a vanishing
term, with arbitrarily high probability. In a later stage, we
extract a realization of
{
Cn(k)
}Kn
k=1
that is both reliable and
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semantically-secure, and define our CR-code to be uniformly
distributed over the codes in the realization.
Thus, for each s ∈ Sn and (m,w) ∈ Mn ×Wn, consider
the random variable
1
Kn
Kn∑
k=1
em,w
(
Wns , Cn(k)
)
, (103)
where a possible value of each em,w
(
Wns , Cn(k)
)
, k ∈ [1 :
Kn] and γk ∈ Γ˜n, is
em,w
(
Wns , cn(k)
)
, em,w
(
Wns , c
(γk)
n
)
=
∑
y∈Yn:
φ(n)γk
(y) 6=(m,w)
Wns
(
y
∣∣x(m,w, γk)). (104)
This is an average of Kn independent random variables, each
bounded between 0 and 1. Furthermore, the expected value
of each equals to Em,w(Wns , C˜n), and therefore, (102) implies
that
Eµ˜nem,w
(
Wns , Cn(k)
)
≤
cδ,ν
n
, (105)
for each s ∈ SnQ, (m,w) ∈Mn ×Wn and k ∈ [1 : Kn]. The
probability of (103) not decaying to zero under any s ∈ SnQ
and (m,w) ∈ Mn ×Wn is upper bounded using the version
of the Chernoff bound from [50, Lemma 4].
Lemma 6 (Chernoff Bound [50]) Let {Xℓ}Lℓ=1 be a collec-
tion of i.i.d. random variables with common distribution P ,
such that supp(P ) ⊆ [0, B] and EXℓ ≤ µ 6= 0, for all
ℓ ∈ [1 : L]. Then for any c with cµ ∈ [1, 2],
PPL
(
1
L
L∑
ℓ=1
Xℓ ≥ c
)
≤ e−
Lµ
3B (
c
µ
−1)2 . (106)
Setting Kn = n3 and using (106) with L = Kn, µ = cδ,νn ,
B = 1, and cµ = 2, assures that
1
Kn
∑Kn
k=1 em,w
(
Wns , Cn(k)
)
is arbitrarily small with probability super-exponentially close
to 1. That is, for each s ∈ SnQ and (m,w) ∈ Mn ×Wn, we
have
Pµ˜nn
(
1
Kn
Kn∑
k=1
em,w
(
Wns , Cn(k)
)
≥
2cδ,ν
n
)
≤ e−
1
3
cδ,νKn
n
= e−
cδ,νn
2
3 .
(107)
By (107) and the union bound, we have
Pµ˜nn




max
s∈SnQ,
(m,w)
∈Mn×Wn
1
Kn
Kn∑
k=1
em,w
(
Wns , Cn(k)
)
<
2cδ,ν
n


c

= Pµ˜nn

 maxs∈SnQ,
(m,w)
∈Mn×Wn
1
Kn
Kn∑
k=1
em,w
(
Wns , Cn(k)
)
≥
2cδ,ν
n


≤
∑
s∈SnQ
∑
(m,w)
∈Mn×Wn
Pµ˜nn
(
1
Kn
Kn∑
k=1
em,w
(
Wns , Cn(k)
)
≥
2cδ,ν
n
)
≤
∣∣SnQ∣∣ · |Mn| · |Wn| · e− cδ,νn23
(a)
≤ |S|n · 2n
(
minQ∈Q IQ(X;Y )− δ2
)
· e−
cδ,νn
2
3
, κ(1)n , (108)
where (a) uses (100) and
∣∣SnQ∣∣ ≤ |S|n. Note that κ(1)n → 0 as
n→∞.
Security Analysis: We show that the probability of{
Cn(k)
}Kn
k=1
violating the SS requirement is arbitrarily small.
First, for any γ ∈ Γ˜n, PM ∈ P(Mn) and s ∈ Sn, let
P
(γ,s)
M,W,X,Zs
be the induced joint distribution over Mn × Zn,
which is given by (see (83))
P
(γ,s)
M,Zs
(m, z) = PM (m)
1
|Wn|
∑
w∈Wn
V ns
(
z
∣∣x(m,w, γ)).
(109a)
Accounting also for the random codebook construction, we
define Gn ∼ µ˜n as a random variable taking values in Γ˜n and
set
P
(s)
Gn,M,Zs
(γ,m, z) = µ˜n(γ)P
(γ,s)
M,Zs
(m, z). (109b)
For any s ∈ Sn and γ ∈ Γn, have
max
s∈SnQ,
PM∈P(Mn)
D
(
P
(s)
Zs|M,Gn=γ
∣∣∣∣∣∣P (s)Zs|Gn=γ
∣∣∣PM)
(a)
≤ max
s∈SnQ,
PM∈P(Mn)
D
(
P
(s)
Zs|M,Gn=γ
∣∣∣∣∣∣QnZ|S=s∣∣∣PM)
= max
s∈SnQ,
PM∈P(Mn)
∑
m∈Mn
PM (m)D
(
P
(s)
Zs|M=m,Gn=γ
∣∣∣∣∣∣QnZ|S=s)
≤ max
s∈SnQ,
m∈Mn
D
(
P
(s)
Zs|M=m,Gn=γ
∣∣∣∣∣∣QnZ|S=s), (110)
where (a) is because for any s ∈ SnQ and PM ∈ P(Mn)
D
(
P
(s)
Zs|M,Gn=γ
∣∣∣∣∣∣P (s)Zs|Gn=γ
∣∣∣PM)
= D
(
P
(s)
Zs|M,Gn=γ
∣∣∣∣∣∣QnZ|S=s∣∣∣PM)−D(P (s)Zs|Gn=γ
∣∣∣∣∣∣QnZ|S=s)
≤ D
(
P
(s)
Zs|M,Gn=γ
∣∣∣∣∣∣QnZ|S=s∣∣∣PM) . (111)
Furthermore, by Lemma 1, for any m ∈ Mn and s ∈ Sn
with empirical PMF νs, taking R˜ > IνsQ(X ;Z|S)+ζ for any
ζ > 0, implies that there exist γ1, γ2 > 0 (uniform in s), such
that for n large enough
Pµ˜n
(
D
(
P
(s)
Zs|M=m,Gn
∣∣∣∣∣∣QnZ|S=s) > e−nγ1
)
≤ e−e
nγ2
.
(112)
As all s ∈ SnQ have νs ∈ Q, setting
R˜ = max
Q∈Q
IQ(X ;Z|S) +
δ
2
(113)
gives (112) for every s ∈ SnQ.
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Now, with respect to the collection of the i.i.d. random
variables
{
Gn(k)
}Kn
k=1
from before (which are, in fact, i.i.d.
copies of Gn), with Kn = n3, we have that for n sufficiently
large12
Pµ˜nn

 maxk∈[1:Kn],
s∈SnQ,
PM∈P(Mn)
D
(
P
(s)
Zs|M,Gn(k)
∣∣∣∣∣∣P (s)Zs|Gn(k)
∣∣∣PM)> e−nγ1


(a)
≤ Pµ˜nn

 maxk∈[1:Kn],
s∈SnQ,
m∈Mn
D
(
P
(s)
Zs|M=m,Gn(k)
∣∣∣∣∣∣QnZ|S=s) > e−nγ1


(b)
≤
Kn∑
k=1
∑
s∈SnQ
∑
m∈Mn
Pµ˜n
(
D
(
P
(s)
Zs|M=m,Gn
∣∣∣∣∣∣QnZ|S=s)>e−nγ1
)
(c)
≤ n3 · |S|n · 2nR · e−e
nγ2
, κ(2)n , (114)
where (a) uses (110), (b) follows by the union bound and
because
{
Gn(k)
}Kn
k=1
being i.i.d. copies of Gn ∼ µ˜n, which
implies
Pµ˜nn
(
D
(
P
(s)
Zs|M=m,Cn(k)
∣∣∣∣∣∣QnZ|S=s) > e−nγ1
)
= Pµ˜n
(
D
(
P
(s)
Zs|M=m,Cn
∣∣∣∣∣∣QnZ|S=s)>e−nγ1
)
, ∀k ∈ [1 :Kn],
while (c) is by (112)-(113). The double-exponential decay of
probability that Lemma 1 provides yields κ(2)n → 0 as n→∞.
Realization Extraction and CR-code Construction: As
long as the rate constraints in (100) and (113) hold, Equa-
tions (108) and (114) along with the Selection Lemma from
[50, Lemma 5], imply the existence of a realization of{
Gn(k)
}Kn
k=1
, denoted by
{
γk
}Kn
k=1
, that for any n sufficiently
large satisfies
max
s∈SnQ,
(m,w)∈Mn×Wn
1
Kn
Kn∑
k=1
em,w
(
Wns , cn(k)
)
≤
2cδ,ν
n
(115a)
max
k∈[1:Kn],
s∈SnQ,
PM∈P(Mn)
D
(
P
(γk,s)
Zs|M
∣∣∣∣∣∣P (γk,s)Zs
∣∣∣PM) ≤ e−nγ1 . (115b)
where, as defined in the CR-reduction part of the proof,
cn(k) , c
(γk)
n .
Set Γn = [1 : Kn], Cn ,
{
cn(k)
}
k∈Γn and µn(k) = K
−1
n .
Associating a CR (n,Mn,Kn)-code Cn with Γn, Cn and µn,
(115b) is clearly equivalent to
LSem(V
n,Q,Cn) ≤ e
−nγ1 . (116)
Next, since for every s ∈ SnQ and (m,w) ∈ Mn ×Wn, we
12In the following chain of inequalities, we consider conditional marginal
distributions of a joint distribution P (s)
Gn(k),M,W,X,Zs
, where k ∈ [1 : Kn],
each defined exactly like in (109), but with Gn(k) in the role of Gn.
have
Em,w(W
n
s ,Cn) ≥
∑
k∈Γn
µn(k)
∑
x∈Xn
fγk(x|m)
∑
y∈Yn:
φ(n)γk
(y) 6=m
Wns (y|x)
= Em(W
n
s ,Cn), (117)
(115a) implies
E(Wn,Q,Cn) = max
s∈SnQ,
m∈Mn
Em(W
n
s ,Cn) ≤
2cδ,ν
n
. (118)
The proof is concluded by combining (100) with (113) to
eliminate R˜, which leaves us with
1
n
logMn ≤ min
Q1∈Q
IQ1(X ;Y )− max
Q2∈Q
IQ2 (X ;Z|S)− δ,
(119)
(116) and (118). As δ > 0 was arbitrary, this implies the
existence of a sufficiently large n for which (48) is satisfied.
Remark 21 (Relation to Uncorrelated SS-Capacity)
Recall that Kn = n3, i.e., our reduced CR-code Cn is only
polynomial in size. This has implication to the uncorrelated
scenario because if the uncorrelated SS-capacity is strictly
positive, one may replace the shared randomness between the
legitimate parties with local randomness at the transmitter
(which is always available in WTC scenarios). In a CR-code,
the shared randomness is used for selecting which code
cn(γ), where γ ∈ Γn, from Cn will be employed thorough the
transmission. Instead, the transmitter may select γ ∈ Γn and
communicate it to the receiver as a prefix. Since Kn = n3,
the positivity of the uncorrelated capacity ensures the reliable
transmission of γ with a vanishing rate. A condition that
differentiates between Q-constrained AVWTCs with zero and
non-zero uncorrelated capacities and a dichotomy result
(stating that the uncorrelated capacity is either zero or
equal to the CR-assisted capacity) are thus the missing
pieces in telling whether the RHS of (51) lower bounds
the uncorrelated SS-capacity of a given AVWTC. Such a
dichotomy result [21] based on a certain threshold property
(namely, the symmetrizability of the main AVC) [22] is
known for the scenario with unconstrained states. Therefore,
Theorem 2 holds for uncorrelated codes when Q = P(S)
and the considered AVWTC satisfies the condition from [22]
for having a positive uncorrelated SS-capacity.
VI. PROOF FOR THEOREM 3
Fix ∅ 6= Q ⊂ P(S) (if Q = ∅ there is nothing to prove)
and assume without loss of generality that Q ⊆ PQ(S), i.e.,
that it contains only rational PMFs. Otherwise, the CR-assisted
SS-capacity being a monotone non-increasing function of the
constraint set (see Remark 7), implies
CR(W,V,Q) ≤ CR
(
W,V,Q∩ PQ(S)
)
. (120)
Let R ∈ R+ be an achievable CR-assisted SS-rate for the Q-
constrained AVWTC (Wn,Vn,Q). Then, for all ǫ > 0 and
sufficiently large n, there exists a CR (n,Mn,Kn)-code Cn
that satisfies (48). To get the max-inf upper bound of Theorem
21
3, we derive an upper bound on CR(W,V,Q) that is uniform
in QS ∈ Q.
Fix ǫ > 0 and let Cn be the corresponding CR (n,Mn,Kn)-
code that satisfies (48) for some sufficiently large n. Further
let Cn =
{
cn(γ)
}
γ∈Γn , where |Γn| = Kn, and µn ∈ P(Γn)
be the associated family of (n,Mn)-codes and the PMF over
this family, respectively. For any QS ∈ Q the reliability and
the security constrains for achievability stated in (48b)-(48c)
continue to hold when restricting the state sequences to T nQS(instead of allowing any s ∈ Sn with empirical PMF νs ∈ Q).
Thus, for any QS ∈ Q and sufficiently large n we have
max
s∈T nQS ,
m∈Mn
Em(W
n
s ,Cn) ≤ E(W
n,Q,Cn) ≤ ǫ (121a)
max
γ∈Γn,
s∈T nQS ,
PM∈P(Mn)
ℓ
(
V ns , PM , cn(γ)
)
≤ LSem(V
n,Q,Cn) ≤ ǫ. (121b)
Although the value of n beyond which (121) becomes valid
may depend on Q, it is independent of any certain QS ∈ Q.
Fix QS ∈ Q and recall that if n ∈ N is a blocklength for
which T nQS = ∅, then (48b)-(48c) are trivially satisfied. We
avoid these trivial blocklengths by henceforth only considering
values of n that belong to Nℓ, as defined in Section IV-D. To
remind the reader, Nℓ ,
{
n · ℓ
∣∣n ∈ N}, where ℓ is the least
common denominator of all the non-zero entries of QS .
Since for any QS ∈ Q, (121a) ensures that Em
(
Wns ,Cn
)
≤
ǫ, for all s ∈ T nQS and m ∈Mn, we have
E¯(Wn, QS ,Cn), max
s∈T nQS
∑
γ∈Γn
µn(γ)
1
Mn
∑
m∈Mn
em
(
Wns , cn(γ)
)
≤ ǫ, (122)
for n large enough. Similarly, by (121b) it also holds that
L(Vn, QS ,Cn) , max
s∈T nQS
∑
γ∈Γn
µn(γ)ℓ
(
V ns , P
(U)
M , cn(γ)
)
≤ ǫ,
(123)
where P (U)M is the uniform PMF on Mn. In other words, a
small maximal error probability and SS (for all the codes in
Cn) imply small average error probability and strong secrecy
(when taking the expectation over the ensemble Cn).
For any γ ∈ Γn let Υ(γ) be a PMF on Sn ×Mn × Xn ×
Yn ×Zn × Mˆn defined by
Υ
(γ)
S,M,X,Y,Z,Mˆ
(s,m,x,y, z, mˆ)
, QnS(s)P
(γ,s)
M,X,Ys,Zs,Mˆ
(m,x,y, z, mˆ), (124)
where P (γ,s) is an abbreviation of P (cn(γ),s) from (42) and
we set P (γ,s)M = P
(U)
M , for all γ ∈ Γn and s ∈ Sn. Thus, for
every s ∈ Sn with QnS(s) > 0 and any γ ∈ Γn, the conditional
PMF of Υ(γ) given S = s equals the corresponding induced
PMF P (γ,s). Furthermore, let Cn be a random variable that
describes the choice of an (n,Mn)-code cn(γ), γ ∈ Γn, from
the family Cn according to the distribution µn. We now set
ΥCn,S,M,X,Y,Z,Mˆ
(
cn(γ), s,m,x,y, z, mˆ
)
, µn(γ)Υ
(γ)
S,M,X,Y,Z,Mˆ
(s,m,x,y, z, mˆ) (125a)
P
(s)
Cn,M,X,Y,Z,Mˆ
(
cn(γ),m,x,y, z, mˆ)
, µn(γ)P
(γ,s)
M,X,Y,Z,Mˆ
(m,x,y, z, mˆ
)
. (125b)
Henceforth, we use IΥ(·) and IP (·) to indicate that a mutual
information term is calculated with respect to Υ or P (s)
from (125). We now present three technical lemmas that are
essential in establishing the result of Theorem 3. For the proofs
of Lemmas 7, 8 and 9 see Appendices D, E and F, respectively.
Lemma 7 (Leakage under Typical State Sequence) For
any QS ∈ P(S), α ∈ (0, 1], n ∈ Nℓ and s1 ∈ T nα (QS), there
exists s2 ∈ T nQS , such that∣∣∣IΥ(M ;Zn|Sn = s1, Cn)− IΥ(M ;Zn|Sn = s2, Cn)∣∣∣
≤ nα log |Z|. (126)
Lemma 8 (Average Leakage under Υ) For any QS ∈ Q,
α ∈ (0, 1] and n ∈ Nℓ sufficiently large that is independent of
QS and α, the following relation holds
IΥ(M ;Z
n|Sn, Cn) ≤ nη
(1)
n,α, (127)
where η(1)n,α , ǫn + log |Z|
(
α+ 2|S|e
−2n α2
|S|2
)
.
Recall the definition of the averaged DMC WQ : X →
P(Y) from (87), given by
WQ(y|x) =
∑
s∈S
QS(s)Ws(y|x), ∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y. (128)
The n-fold extension of WQ satisfies
WnQ(y|x) =
n∏
i=1
∑
s∈S
QS(s)Ws(yi|xi)
=
∑
s∈Sn
QnS(s)W
n
s (y|x)
= Υ(y|x), ∀(x,y) ∈ Xn × Yn. (129)
Thus, the conditional marginal PMF ΥY|X of Υ from (125)
describes an n-length block transmission over the average
channel WnQ. As subsequently shown, the derivation of our
single-letter upper bound relies on the normalized equivocation
of the message M given an output sequence Y n of the
average DMC WnQ being small. Commonly, Fano’s inequality
implies that quantities such as 1nH(M |Y
n) can be made
arbitrarily small with n. Here, however, this equivocation term
is not directly related to the performance criteria defining
CR-assisted achievability. A brute force application of Fano’s
inequality based on (121a) gives
max
s∈T n
QS
HP (M |Y
n
s , Cn) ≤ 1 + ǫ logMn. (130)
However, it remains to be shown that (130) implies that
1
nHΥ(M |Y
n, Cn) is small. In general, for any s ∈ T nQS , the
channel Ws ∈ W is at least as good as WQ, meaning that
the averaged channel induces a possibly larger equivocation.
Nonetheless, the equivocation of the message given the output
sequence of WnQ is upper bounded in Lemma 9.
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Lemma 9 (Equivocation under Averaged Channel) For
any QS ∈ Q, α ∈
(
0, 12
]
and n ∈ Nℓ sufficiently large that is
independent of QS and α, the following relation holds
HΥ(M |Y
n, Cn) ≤ nη
(2)
n,α, (131)
where η(2)n,α = 1n+
1
n logMn
(
ǫ+ 2|S|e
−2n α2
|S|2
)
+α log |Y|+
2h(α) + |S| log(n+1)n and h is the binary entropy function.
Fix d ∈
(
0, 12
)
and let αn = n−(
1
2−d), for n ∈ Nℓ.
Accordingly,
{
αn
}
n∈Nℓ vanishes to 0 slower than
1√
n
, which
means that for sufficiently large n, random noise is typical with
respect to αn with arbitrarily high probability. Furthermore,
αn ∈
(
0, 12
]
, for every n ≥ 2
2
1−2d , so replacing α from
Lemmas 8 and 9 with αn, for sufficiently large n we have
IΥ(M ;Z
n|Sn, Cn) ≤ nη
(1)
n (132a)
HΥ(M |Y
n, Cn) ≤ nη
(2)
n , (132b)
where
η(1)n , η
(1)
n,αn =
ǫ
n
+ log |Z|
(
αn + 2|S|e
− 2n2d
|S|2
)
(133a)
η(2)n , η
(2)
n,αn =
1
n
+
1
n
logMn
(
ǫ+2|S|e
−2n2d
|S|2
)
+αn log |Y|
+ 2h(αn) + |S|
log(n+ 1)
n
, (133b)
and consequently limn→∞ η(j)n = 0, for j = 1, 2. Note that the
independence of n and α is essential for applying the Lemmas
with the vanishing sequence
{
αn
}
n∈Nℓ . Furthermore, (132)
uniformly hold for all QS ∈ Q.
Having (132)-(133), we proceed with upper bounding the
achievable rate R. Unless explicitly stated otherwise, all subse-
quent information measures are taken with respect to Υ, which
is therefore omitted from the notation of mutual information.
For any QS and n ∈ Nℓ sufficiently large (in particular, larger
than 2
2
1−2d ), we have
logMn
(a)
≤ I(M ;Y n|Cn)− I(M ;S
n, Zn|Cn) + nηn
(b)
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(M ;Y i, Sni+1, Z
n
i+1|Cn)
− I(M ;Y i−1, Sni , Z
n
i |Cn)
]
+ nηn
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(M ;Yi|Y
i−1, Sni+1, Z
n
i+1, Cn)
− I(M ;Si, Zi|Y
i−1, Sni+1, Z
n
i+1, Cn)
]
+ nηn
(c)
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(M ;Yi|Vi)− I(M ;Si, Zi|Vi)
]
+ nηn, (134)
where:
(a) uses (132) and the independence of (M,Sn, Cn), while
defining ηn , η(1)n + η(2)n ;
(b) follows by a telescoping identity [54, Equations (9) and
(11)] and the independence of Cn, M and Sn;
(c) is by defining Vi , (Y i−1, Sni+1, Zni+1, Cn), for all i ∈ [1 :
n]. The identification of Vi is uniform in QS ∈ Q.
The bound in (134) is rewritten by introducing a time-
sharing random variable T that is uniformly distributed over
the set [1 : n] and is independent of (Sn,M,Xn, Y n, Zn):
1
n
logMn
≤
1
n
n∑
t=1
[
I(M ;Yt|Vt)− I(M ;St, Zt|Vt)
]
+ ηn
=
n∑
t=1
P
(
T = t
)[
I(M ;Yt|Vt)− I(M ;St, Zt|Vt)
]
+ ηn
= I(M ;YT |VT , T )− I(M ;ST , ZT |VT , T ) + ηn. (135)
Denoting ST , S, V , (VT , T ), U , (M,V ), X , XT ,
Y , YT and Z , ZT . Lemma 10 establishes an independence
property under Υ, which is key in deriving the factorization
property of the distribution of (S, V, U,X, Y, Z) (induced by
Υ), stated in Lemma 11. Both lemmas are proven in Appendix
G.
Lemma 10 For any QS ∈ Q, Si and
(Cn, S
n\i,M,Xn, Y n\i, Zn\i) are independent under Υ
from (125a).
Lemma 11 For any QS ∈ Q and (s, v, u, x, y, z) ∈ S × V ×
U × X × Y × Z , where V and U are the alphabets that
correspond to the definitions of V and U stated above, the
following factorization holds
PΥ(V = v, U = u,X = x, S = s, Y = y, Z = z)
= PΥ(V = v, U = u,X = x)QS(s)Ws(y|x)Vs(z|x).
(136)
Denoting PΥ(V = v, U = u,X = x) , QV,U,X(v, u, x), for
all (v, u, x) ∈ V × U × X , Lemma 11 shows that the joint
distribution of (S, V, U,X, Y, Z) factors as stated in Theorem
3.
Finally, we substitute ηn = η(1)n + η(2)n , while using the
definition of η(2)n and (48a), to get that for any QS ∈ Q and
n sufficiently large
R <
IQ(U ;Y |V )− IQ(U ;S,Z|V )
1− ǫ− 2|S|e−2n2d
+
η
(1)
n + ǫ+
1
n + αn log |Y|+ 2h(αn) + |S|
log(n+1)
n
1− ǫ− 2|S|e
− 2n2d
|S|2
+ ǫ,
(137)
where IQ denotes that the underlying distribution of the
mutual information terms is QV,U,XQSQY |X,SQZ|X,S , where
QY |X,S(y|x, s) = Ws(y|x) and QZ|X,S(z|x, s) = Vs(z|x),
for all (s, x, y, z) ∈ S × X × Y × Z . Letting n→∞ (which
takes αn and η(1)n to 0) and ǫ→ 0 gives
R ≤ IQ(U ;Y |V )− IQ(U ;S,Z|V ), ∀QS ∈ Q. (138)
Taking an infimum of the RHS (138) over all QS ∈ Q further
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gives
R ≤ inf
QS∈Q
[
IQ(U ;Y |V )− IQ(U ;S,Z|V )
]
. (139)
Further upper bounding the RHS of (139) by maximizing it
over all QV,U,X ∈ P(V × U × X ) concludes the proof.
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
We derived the CR-assisted SS-capacity of the AVWTC
with type constrained states. The constraint allows only the
state sequences whose empirical distribution is within a small
gap from the prescribed type. Achievability relies on a general
single-letter lower bound on the capacity of the Q-constrained
AVWTC that does not assume the existence of a best chan-
nel to the eavesdropper. To establish SS under each of the
exponentially many possible states, the mutual information
between the message and the eavesdropper’s observations was
shown to be negligible even when maximized over all message
distributions, choices of state sequences and realizations of
the CR-code. The SS analysis was based on a heterogeneous
version of the strong soft-covering lemma that was recently
presented in [50]. The lemma showed that the probability
(with respect to a randomly generated codebook) of the
soft-covering phenomenon happening is doubly-exponentially
close to one, when transmitting over a state-dependent channel
with a certain state sequence realization. The condition for the
above is that the rate of the codebook is above the conditional
mutual information between the input and output given the
state. An application of the union bound combined with a CR-
code reduction argument (based on a Chernoff bound) then
establishes SS. The resulting reliable and semantically-secure
reduced CR-code is over a family of (uncorrelated) codes that
is only polynomial in size.
The converse for the type constrained scenario used a gen-
eral upper bound on CR(W,V,Q). Derived uniformly over
the constraint set, the upper bound has a max-inf form, and
when specialized to a compound WTC over a corresponding
constraint set, it improves upon the previously best known
single-letter upper bound for that problem [29, Theorem 2].
The proof of the upper bound showed that reliability and
SS under all state sequences in any type-class imply similar
performance when the state sequence is i.i.d. according to the
type. The main challenge was in proving that the normalized
equivocation of the message given the output sequence is
negligible for outputs generated by the averaged main channel.
This step required a continuity property that was derived via
a novel distribution coupling argument. Combining our upper
and lower bounds with some continuity arguments established
the SS-capacity of the type constrained AVWTC. The formula
has the structure of two subtracted mutual information terms.
The first term suggests that the legitimate users effectively
transmit over the averaged DMC, which is in general no better
than any of the main channels associated with each state. The
second (subtracted) mutual information term corresponds to
ensuring secrecy versus an eavesdropper with perfect CSI.
Our main goal was to find a single-letter description of
the admissible secrecy-rate in an AVWTC scenario while
accounting for each of its exponential number of security con-
straints (instead of relying on assumptions that degenerate the
scenario to a single dominating constraint). The heterogeneous
strong soft-covering lemma allowed us to do just that, while
upgrading to SS. Our achievability proof showed the existence
of CR-assisted SS-capacity achieving CR-code of polynomial
size. Consequently, combining our code construction with a
condition that identifies whether a given type constrained
AVWTC has zero or non-zero uncorrelated capacity, will
suffice for characterizing the uncorrelated SS-capacity. Such a
differentiating condition being currently unknown, we pose it
as a question for future research.
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Let QU,X ∈ P(U × X ) and denote
I(QS , QU,X) , IQS (U ;Y )− IQS (U ;Z|S), (140a)
Iδ(QS , QU,X) , min
Q1∈Pδ(QS)
IQ1(U ;Y )
− max
Q2∈Pδ(QS)
IQ2(U ;Z|S), (140b)
where IQ stands for the mutual information term being calcu-
lated with respect to Q as the state distribution. Note that for
any QU,X and δ > 0 we have
Iδ(QS , QU,X) ≤ I(QS , QU,X), (141)
and therefore
I∗δ (QS) , max
QU,X
Iδ(QS , QU,X)
≤ max
QU,X
I(QS , QU,X)
= C⋆R(W,V, QS). (142)
Fix QU,X ∈ P(U ×X ). The continuity of mutual informa-
tion implies that for every Q1, Q2 ∈ Pδ(QS), we have∣∣∣IQS (U ;Y )− IQ1 (U ;Y )∣∣∣ ≤ f1(δ) (143a)∣∣∣IQS (U ;Z|S)− IQ2 (U ;Z|S)∣∣∣ ≤ f2(δ), (143b)
where limδ→0 fj(δ) = 0, for j = 1, 2, uniformly in QU,X
(i.e., f1 and f2 are independent of QU,X ). For any δ > 0, if
Q⋆1 ∈ Pδ(QS) achieves minQ1∈Pδ(QS) IQ1(U ;Y ), then (143a)
implies
IQS (U ;Y ) ≤ IQ⋆1 (U ;Y ) + f1(δ)
= min
Q1∈Pδ(QS)
IQ1(U ;Y ) + f1(δ). (144)
Similarly, we also have
IQS (U ;Z|S) ≥ max
Q2∈Pδ(QS)
IQ2(U ;Z|S)− f2(δ). (145)
Combining (144) and (145) shows that
I(QS , QU,X) ≤ Iδ(QS , QU,X) + f1(δ) + f2(δ), (146)
for every QU,X ∈ P(U×X ) and δ > 0, which, in turn, implies
C⋆R(W,V, QS) ≤ I
∗
δ (QS)+ f1(δ)+ f2(δ), ∀δ > 0. (147)
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Since limδ→0 fj(δ) = 0, for j = 1, 2, (142) and (147)
produce (74).
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Let η > 0 be arbitrary and with respect to the random
codebook Bn, for every y ∈ Yn, define the random variable
Φn(y) =


(m,w),
max
(m′,w′)∈Mn×Wn:
(m′,w′) 6=(m,w)
d
(
X(m′, w′, γ),y
)
< d
(
X(m,w, γ),y
)
e, no (m,w) as above exists
.
(148)
Furthermore, for every (m,w) ∈ Mn × Wn and y ∈ Yn,
also set Z(y,m,w) = 1{
Φn(y) 6=(m,w)
}
. With respect to the
measure µ˜n from (82), we have
Em,w(Wn, C˜n)
= Eµ˜n
∑
y∈Yn
Wn
(
y
∣∣X(m,w))Z(y,m,w)
(a)
=
∑
x∈Xn
QnX(x)
∑
y∈Yn
Wn(y|x)
× Eµ˜n
[
Z(y,m,w)
∣∣∣X(m,w) = x]
=
∑
(x,y)∈Xn×Yn
QnX(x)Wn(y|x)
× Pµ˜n
(
Φn(y) 6= (m,w)
∣∣∣X(m,w) = x)
(b)
=
∑
(x,y)∈Xn×Yn
QnX(x)Wn(y|x)
× Pµ˜n

 max
(m′,w′)∈Mn×Wn:
(m′,w′) 6=(m,w)
d
(
X(m′, w′),y
)
≥ d(x,y)

 ,
(149)
where (a) is the law of total expectation (by first taking
a conditional expectation on X(m,w)), while (b) uses the
definition of Φn(y) and the independence of the random
vectors in the collection Bn.
For all (x,y) ∈ Xn × Yn with d(x,y) ≥ |Mn||Wn|η , we
upper bound the probability on the RHS of (149) as
Pµ˜n

 max
(m′,w′)∈Mn×Wn:
(m′,w′) 6=(m,w)
d
(
X(m′, w′),y
)
≥ d(x,y)


≤ Pµ˜n

 max
(m′,w′)∈Mn×Wn:
(m′,w′) 6=(m,w)
d
(
X(m′, w′),y
)
≥
|Mn||Wn|
η


= Pµ˜n


⋃
(m′,w′)∈Mn×Wn:
(m′,w′) 6=(m,w)
{
d
(
X(m′, w′),y
)
≥
|Mn||Wn|
η
}


(a)
≤
∑
(m′,w′)∈Mn×Wn:
(m′,w′) 6=(m,w)
PQn
X
(
d
(
X,y
)
≥
|Mn||Wn|
η
)
(b)
≤ η
∑
(m′,w′)∈Mn×Wn:
(m′,w′) 6=(m,w)
EQn
X
d
(
X,y
)
|Mn||Wn|
(c)
≤ η (150)
where (a) uses the union bound and the fact that X(m′, w′) ∼
QnX , for all (m′, w′) ∈Mn×Wn, (b) is Markov’s inequality
and (c) follows by the assumption that EQn
X
d(X,y) ≤ 1, for
all y ∈ Yn.
Plugging (150) back into (149) completes the proof:
Em,w(Wn, C˜n) ≤
∑
(x,y)∈Xn×Yn:
d(x,y)<
|Mn||Wn|
η
QnX(x)Wn(y|x) · 1
+
∑
(x,y)∈Xn×Yn:
d(x,y)≥ |Mn||Wn|
η
QnX(x)Wn(y|x) · η
≤ PQn
X
Wn
(
d(X,Y) <
|Mn||Wn|
η
)
+ η.
(151)
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First define
WQ ,
{
WQ : X → P(Y)
∣∣∣Q ∈ Q}, (152)
and note that the convexity of Q implies that WQ is also a
convex set. Throughout this proof we make use of a slightly
modified notation of mutual information. Specifically, we
represent the mutual information between a pair of random
variables in terms of their underlying joint distribution, i.e., for
any P ∈ P(X ) and W : X → P(Y), let I(P,W ) , I(X ;Y ),
where (X,Y ) ∼ P ·W . Accordingly, we may write
min
Q∈Q
IQ(X ;Y ) = min
W∈WQ
I(QX ,W ). (153)
Let W˜ ∈ WQ be a channel that achieves the RHS of
(153), i.e., with respect to the notation in the error probability
analysis from Section V, we have
I
(
QX , W˜
)
= IQ˜(X ;Y ). (154)
The convexity of WQ implies that for every W ∈ WQ and
α ∈ [0, 1]
I
(
QX , αW + (1− α)W˜
)
≥ I
(
QX , W˜
)
, (155)
and therefore,
lim
αց0
∂
∂α
I
(
QX , αW + (1− α)W˜
)
≥ 0. (156)
Similarly to [49, Equation (12.19)], since
∂
∂α
I
(
QX , αW + (1− α)W˜
)
25
=
∑
(x,y)∈X×Y
QX(x)
(
W (y|x)− W˜ (y|x)
)
× log
(
αW (y|x) + (1 − α)W˜ (y|x)
αQY (y) + (1 − α)Q˜Y (y)
)
, (157)
where QY (y) =
∑
x∈X QX(x)W (y|x) and Q˜Y (y) =∑
x∈X QX(x)W˜ (y|x), it follows that
∑
(x,y)∈X×Y
QX(x)W (y|x) log
(
W˜ (y|x)
Q˜Y (y)
)
≥ I
(
QX , W˜
)
= IQ˜(X ;Y ). (158)
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Fix QS ∈ Q, α ∈ (0, 1], n ∈ Nℓ and s1 ∈ T nα (QS). Clearly,
there exists an s2 ∈ T nQS , such that
dH(s1, s2) ≤ nα, (159)
where dH : Sn × Sn → [0 : n] is the Hamming distance
function. Let A be the set of indices for which the components
of s1 and s2 coincide, i.e.,
A =
{
i ∈ [1 : n]
∣∣s1,i = s2,i}. (160)
Note that (159) implies that |Ac| ≤ nα.
Recall that for any subset ∅ 6= A ⊆ [1 : n] and any n-
dimensional vector x ∈ Xn, we denote the vector of elements
from x with indices in A by xA, that is, xA = (xi)i∈A.
Similar convention is used for random vectors, while using
uppercase letters. By the mutual information chain rule, the
absolute value of the difference of mutual information terms
from (126) is upper bounded as follows:∣∣IΥ(M ;Zn|Sn = s1, Cn)− IΥ(M ;Zn|Sn = s2, Cn)∣∣
≤
∣∣∣IΥ(M ;ZA∣∣Sn = s1, Cn)− IΥ(M ;ZA∣∣Sn = s2, Cn)∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣IΥ(M ;ZAc ∣∣ZA, Sn = s1, Cn)
− IΥ
(
M ;ZA
c ∣∣ZA, Sn = s2, Cn)∣∣∣
(a)
≤
∣∣∣IΥ(M ;ZA∣∣SA = sA1 , Cn)−IΥ(M ;ZA∣∣SA = sA2 , Cn)∣∣∣
+max
{
IΥ
(
M ;ZA
c∣∣ZA,S = s1, Cn),
IΥ
(
M ;ZA
c∣∣ZA,S = s2, Cn)
}
(b)
≤ max
{
HΥ
(
ZA
c ∣∣Sn = s1), HΥ(ZAc ∣∣Sn = s2)}
(c)
≤ nα log |Z| (161)
where:
(a) is because for any m ∈ Mn, zA ∈ Z |A| and sj , where
j = 1, 2, (124) implies
Υ
(
m, zA
∣∣sj) = ∑
γ∈Γn
µn(γ)
1
Mn
∑
x∈Xn
fγ(x|m)V
|A|
sAj
(
zA
∣∣xA)
= Υ
(
m, zA
∣∣sAj ); (162)
(b) is since sA1 = sA2 , because conditioning cannot increase
entropy and the memoryless property from (162);
(c) holds since entropy is maximized by the uniform distribu-
tion and because |Ac| ≤ nα.
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Fix QS ∈ Q and α ∈ (0, 1]. First observe that for any
n ∈ Nℓ, we have
max
s∈T nα (QS)
IΥ(M ;Z
n|Sn = s, Cn)
(a)
≤ max
s∈T n
QS
IΥ(M ;Z
n|Sn = s, Cn) + nα log |Z|
(b)
= L(Vn, QS ,Cn) + nα log |Z|, (163)
where (a) follows from Lemma 7, while (b) is because
ΥM,Z|S=s = P
(s)
M,Z, for every s ∈ Sn, and the notation in
(123). On account of (123), for sufficiently large values of n
that are independent of QS ∈ Q, it holds that
L(Vn, QS ,Cn) ≤ ǫ. (164)
Consequently, for those values of n, we have13
IΥ(M ;Z
n|Sn, Cn)
=
∑
s∈Sn
QnS(s)IΥ(M ;Z
n|Sn = s, Cn)
≤
∑
s∈T nα (QS)
QnS(s)IΥ(M ;Z
n|Sn = s, Cn)
+
∑
s/∈T nα (QS)
QnS(s)n log |Z|
≤ max
s∈T nα (QS)
IΥ(M ;Z
n|Sn = s, Cn)
+ n log |Z| · PQnS
(
Sn /∈ T nα (QS)
)
(a)
≤ L(Vn, QS ,Cn) + n log |Z|
(
α+ 2|S|e
−2n α2
|S|2
)
(b)
≤ nη(1)n,α, (165)
where (a) uses (163) and the upper bound on the probability
of drawing an atypical sequence from (5), while (b) follows
from (164).
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Fix QS ∈ Q. For any n ∈ Nℓ, let EU (Wn, QS ,Cn) be
the average error probability under the CR-code Cn when the
adversary chooses the state sequence randomly and uniformly
over T nQS . Clearly, for any n sufficiently large (that is inde-
pendent of QS), we have
EU (W
n, QS ,Cn) ≤ E¯(W
n, QS,Cn)
(a)
≤ ǫ, (166)
where (a) is on account of (122).
13Only the last step relies on n being sufficiently large; all other steps are
valid for every n ∈ Nℓ
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For each γ ∈ Γn, the PMF on Sn ×Mn × Xn × Yn ×
Zn × Mˆn describing the random experiment where the state
sequence is uniformly drawn from T nQS is
Λ
(γ)
1 (s,m,x,y, z, mˆ) ,
1{
s∈T n
QS
}
|T nQS |
P (γ,s)(m,x,y, z, mˆ),
(167)
for all (s,m,x,y, z, mˆ) ∈ Sn×Mn×Xn×Yn×Zn×Mˆn.
As before, we set
Λ1
(
cn(γ), s,m,x,y, z, mˆ
)
, µn(γ)Λ
(γ)
1 (s,m,x,y, z, mˆ).
(168)
By (166) and Fano’s inequality, we have
HΛ1(M |Y
n, Cn) ≤ 1 + EU (W
n, QS ,Cn) · logMn
≤ 1 + ǫ logMn, (169)
where the last inequality holds for the aforementioned suffi-
ciently large n values.
To upper bound HΥ(M |Y n, Cn) in terms of
HΛ1(M |Y
n, Cn), we first index all the types in Pn(S)
by i ∈ B ,
[
1 : |Pn(S)|
]
. Set Q1 = QS , and
associate with every Qi ∈ Pn(S), i 6= 1, a PMF Λi
on Cn × Sn ×Mn × Xn × Yn × Zn × Mˆn, that is defined
analogously to Λ1 from (168). Thus, with respect to Λi, the
state sequence is uniformly chosen from T nQi .
Let B be a random variable over B that takes the value
B = i, for i ∈ B, if an i.i.d. state sequence Sn ∼ QnS satisfies
Sn ∈ T nQi . First note that
IΥ(M ;Y
n|Cn) = IΥ(M ;B, Y
n|Cn)− IΥ(M ;B|Y
n, Cn)
≥ IΥ(M ;B, Y
n|Cn)− log |B|
≥ IΥ(M ;B, Y
n|Cn)− |S| log(n+ 1),
(170)
which implies
HΥ(M |Y
n, Cn) ≤ HΥ(M |Y
n, B, Cn) + |S| log(n+ 1).
(171)
Next, we expand the conditional entropy from the RHS of
(171) with respect to B, while splitting it into typical and
atypical realizations of B. Fix α ∈
(
0, 12
]
and define
I(QS , α) =
{
i ∈ B
∣∣∣T nQi ⊂ T nα (QS)}. (172)
For any n ∈ Nℓ, we have
HΥ(M |Y
n, B, Cn)
≤
∑
i∈I(QS ,α)
PQn
S
(
Sn ∈ T nQi
)
HΥ(M |Y
n, B = i, Cn)
+ PQn
S
(
Sn /∈ T nα (QS)
)
· logMn
(a)
≤
∑
i∈I(QS,α)
PQn
S
(
Sn ∈ T nQi
)
HΥ(M |Y
n, Sn ∈ T nQi , Cn)
+ 2|S|e
−2n α2
|S|2 logMn,
(173)
where (a) uses (5) and the definition of B. Recall that
PQn
S
(
Sn = s
∣∣Sn ∈ T nQi) =
1{
s∈T nQi
}
|T nQi |
, ∀s ∈ Sn , ∀i ∈ B,
(174)
and therefore,
HΥ(M |Y
n, B = i, Cn) = HΥ(M |Y
n, Sn ∈ T nQi , Cn)
= HΛi(M |Y
n, Cn). (175)
Having this, we remark that the main idea in upper bounding
HΥ(M |Y n, Cn) is to use (171) and (173), while arguing that
the conditional entropy HΛi(M |Y n, Cn) is small for any 1 6=
i ∈ I(QS , α) (i.e., for any random state sequence in the typical
set) as long as we know it is small for one single type in the
typical set (i.e., as long as (169) holds). To do so, we show
that HΛi(M |Y n, Cn), for all i ∈ I(QS , α), can be replaced
with HΛ1(M |Y n, Cn) with a correction term that can be made
arbitrarily small when normalized by n. With some abuse of
notation, we henceforth denote by Λ1 the marginal PMF of
(168) on Sn×Mn×Xn×Yn. Similarly, for any i ∈ I(QS , α),
Λi denotes the marginal on Sn×Mn×Xn×Yn of the original
Λi.
Fix i ∈ I(QS , α) and let Λ1,i be a coupling of Λ1 and Λi,
which is a PMF on Sn ×Mn ×Xn ×Yn ×Sn ×Yn that is
defined by the following steps:
1) Similarly to the definition of the set A from (160), for
any (s, s˜) ∈ Sn × Sn set
A(s, s˜) ,
{
j ∈ [1 : n]
∣∣sj = s˜j}. (176)
2) For any γ ∈ Γn, define
Λ
(γ)
1,i (s,m,x,y, s˜, y˜)
, Λ
(γ)
1 (s,m,x,y)Λ1,i(s˜|s)Λ1,i(y˜|s,x,y, s˜), (177)
where
Λ1,i(y˜|s,x,y, s˜) = 1 ⋂
j∈A(s,s˜)
{
y˜j=yj
} ∏
j∈A(s,s˜)c
Ws˜j (y˜j |xj),
(178)
and Λ1,i(s˜|s) is defined by the following pseudo-
algorithm.
Algorithm 1 Construction of Λ1,i(s˜|s)
1: s′ ← s
2: while s′ /∈ T nQi do
3: J (s′) :=
{
j ∈ [1 : n]
∣∣N(s′j|s′) > nQi(s′j)}
4: L(s′) :=
{
s ∈ S
∣∣N(s|s′) < nQi(s)}
5: Draw j ∼ Unif (J (s′))
6: Draw s ∼ Unif (L(s′))
7: s′j ← s
Namely, in each step the algorithm first uniformly
chooses an index j ∈ [1 : n], such that the number
of appearances of sj in s is above the quota allowed by
Qi. Then, sj is replaced with a symbol s ∈ S that is
uniformly chosen from the set of symbols whose number
of appearances in s is below the quote subscribed by Qi.
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The procedure repeats itself until the modified sequence
belongs to T nQi . Clearly, the algorithm stops after a finite
number of cycles, since in each cycle the sequence s′
is adjusted so that its empirical PMF of νs′ is closer to
Qi. We give a formal justification for the finite running
time argument subsequently.
3) As a last step, we set
Λ1,i
(
cn(γ), s,m,x,y, s˜, y˜
)
= µn(γ)Λ
(γ)
1,i (s,m,x,y, s˜, y˜). (179)
For any 1 6= i ∈ I(QS , α), the symmetry in constructing
Λ1,i(s˜|s), the uniformity of Λ1,i(s) over T nQS , and the fact that
sequences of the same type are merely permutations of one
another, imply that the marginal PMF of S˜n with respect to
Λ1,i is uniform over T nQi , i.e.,
Λ1,i(s˜) = Λi(s˜) =
1{
s˜∈T n
Qi
}
|T nQi |
. (180)
Recalling the definition of Λ1,i(y˜|s,x,y, s˜) from (178), we
thus obtain
Λ1,i(s˜,m,x, y˜) = Λi(s˜,m,x, y˜), (181)
which shows that Λ1,i is a valid coupling of Λ1 and Λi.
Some additional properties of the algorithms output are
needed. Denote by K ∈ N ∪ {∞} the number of cycles it
takes until Algorithm 1 terminates (i.e., for now, K may be
infinite). For each k ∈ [1 : K] (if K = ∞ then k ∈ [1 : K]
is to be understood as k ∈ N), denote by s′k the s′ sequence
obtained after the k-th cycle. Accordingly, s′0 = s, and if
indeed K < ∞, then s′K = s˜. To analyse the algorithm’s
operation, for each k ∈ [1 : K], define
L
(h)
k =
{
s ∈ S
∣∣∣N(s|s′k) > nQi(s)} (182a)
L
(l)
k =
{
s ∈ S
∣∣∣N(s|s′k) < nQi(s)}, (182b)
and further set
N
(h)
k =
∑
s∈L(h)
k
∣∣N(s|s′k)− nQi(s)∣∣ (183a)
N
(l)
k =
∑
s∈L(l)
k
∣∣N(s|s′k)− nQi(s)∣∣. (183b)
Note that N (h)k = N
(l)
k , for every k ∈ [1 : K], and that in
each iteration both N (h)k and N
(l)
k reduce by 1, i.e.,
N
(h)
k = N
(h)
k−1 − 1, k ∈ [1 : K]. (184)
Clearly, Algorithm 1 terminates once L(h)k = L
(l)
k = ∅, or
equivalently, once N (h)k = N
(l)
k = 0. When combined with
(184), this characterizes K = N (h)0 , thus justifying the finite
running time of the algorithm. Consequently, if
(
Sn, S˜n
)
∼
Λ1,i, then
PΛ1,i
((
Sn, S˜n
)
∈ T nQS × T
n
Qi
)
= 1. (185)
Another important outcome of the algorithm’s operation is
that the sequences Sn and S˜n jointly distributed according to
Λ1,i are almost surely within a Hamming distance of at most
nα. Namely, we claim that
PΛ1,i
(
dH
(
Sn, S˜n
)
≤ nα
)
= 1. (186)
To see the validity of (186), note that in each iteration one
symbol of the current s′k is altered. Furthermore, an altered
symbol is never modified again in any of the succeeding
iterations. As a consequence, this observation implies that
dH(s
′
k−1, s
′
k) = 1, ∀k ∈ [1 : K], (187)
and when combined with the fact the dH(s, s′0) = 0, we obtain
dH(s, s
′
k) = dH(s, s
′
k−1) + 1, ∀k ∈ [1 : K]. (188)
Thus, to show that for dH(s, s˜) ≤ nα, it suffices to show that
the number of cycles K ≤ nα (keeping in mind that s′K = s˜).
Indeed, we have
K = N
(h)
0
(a)
=
∑
s∈L(h)0
∣∣N(s|s)− nQi(s)∣∣ (b)≤ n ∑
s∈L(h)0
α
|S|
(c)
≤ nα,
(189)
where (a) uses (183a), (b) is because T nQi ⊂ T nα (QS), while
(c) follows since
∣∣L(h)0 ∣∣ ≤ |S|.
Having (185)-(186), let Ai
(
Sn, S˜n
)
be a random variable
defined by (176), where (Sn, S˜n) ∼ Λ1,i and 1 6= i ∈
I(QS , α). We abbreviate Ai
(
Sn, S˜n
)
as Ai (and further omit
the index i, when it is clear from the context). Define the
random variable Aci , [1 : n]\Ai, and denote its alphabet by
Aci . As a consequence of (185), for any n ∈ Nℓ, the cardinality
of Aci is upper bounded by [55, Section 3.1]
|Aci | =
⌊nα⌋∑
j=0
(
n
j
)
≤ 2nh(α), ∀1 6= i ∈ I(QS , α), (190)
where h is the binary entropy function. Since Ai and Aci
uniquely define one another, (190) yields
HΛ1,i (A) = HΛ1,i(A
c) ≤ log |Aci | ≤ nh(α), ∀i∈I(QS , α),
(191)
We are now ready to link the mutual information be-
tween the message and the legitimate user’s output sequence
under Λi, to the corresponding term under Λ1. This, in
turn, yields an upper bound on HΛi(M |Y n, Cn) in terms
of HΛ1(M |Y n, Cn), that when combined with (173), suffices
to establish Lemma 9. In the following chain of inequalities
(S˜n, Y˜ n) and (Sn, Y n) denote the state sequence and legit-
imate channel output when distributed according to Λi and
Λ1, respectively. Fix 1 6= i ∈ I(QS , α) and for any n ∈ Nℓ
consider:
IΛi(M ; Y˜
n|Cn)
(a)
≥ IΛ1,i (M ; Y˜
n|A, Cn)−HΛ1,i(A)
≥ IΛ1,i(M ; Y˜
A|A, Cn)−HΛ1,i(A)
(b)
= IΛ1,i (M ;Y
A|A, Cn)−HΛ1,i(A)
= IΛ1,i(M ;Y
A|A, Cn) + IΛ1,i(M ;Y
Ac |YA,A, Cn)
− IΛ1,i(M ;Y
Ac |YA,A, Cn)−HΛ1,i(A)
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(c)
≥ IΛ1,i(M ;Y
n|A, Cn)− nα log |Y| −HΛ1,i(A)
(d)
≥ IΛ1(M ;Y
n|Cn)− nα log |Y| − 2HΛ1,i(A)
(e)
≥ IΛ1(M ;Y
n|Cn)− nα log |Y| − 2nh(α), (192)
where:
(a) and (d) follow by similar arguments as in the lower bound
from (170);
(b) is since since Y˜j = Yj almost surely, for all j ∈ A (cf.
(178));
(c) is because for every a ∈ Ai, we have
IΛ1,i (M ;Y
ac |Ya,A = a, Cn) ≤ |a
c| log |Y| ≤ nα log |Y|;
(e) uses (191).
Clearly, (192) yields
HΛi(M |Y˜
n, Cn)≤HΛ1(M |Y
n, Cn)+nα log |Y|+2nh(α),
(193)
for each 1 6= i ∈ I(QS , α). Inserting this back into (173),
while keeping (171) and (175) in mind, for any n sufficiently
large (that is independent of QS and α), we have
HΥ(M |Y
n, Cn)
≤
∑
i∈I(QS ,α)
PQn
S
(
Sn ∈ T nQi
)
HΛi(M |Y
n, Cn)
+ 2 logMn|S|e
−2n α2
|S|2 + |S| log(n+ 1)
(a)
≤ HΛ1(M |Y
n, Cn) + nα log |Y|+ 2nh(α)
+ 2 logMn|S|e
−2n α2
|S|2 + |S| log(n+ 1)
(b)
≤ nη(2)n,α, (194)
where (a) uses (193), while (b) follows by (169) and by
setting η(2)n,α = 1n+
1
n logMn
(
ǫ+ 2|S|e
−2n α2
|S|2
)
+α log |Y|+
2h(α) + |S| log(n+1)n .
APPENDIX G
PROOF OF LEMMAS 10 AND 11
A. Lemma 10
Fix QS ∈ Q, γ ∈ Γn and i ∈ [1 : n]. For any si ∈ S and(
cn(γ), s
n\i,m, xn, yn\i, zn\i
)
∈ Cn × Sn−1 ×Mn × Xn ×
Yn−1 ×Zn−1, for some γ ∈ Γn, we have
Υ
(
cn(γ),s
n\i,m, xn, yn\i, zn\i
∣∣si)
=
Υ
(
cn(γ), si, s
n\i,m, xn, yn\i, zn\i
∣∣si)
Υ(si)
. (195)
The marginal distribution of Si with respect to Υ from
(125a), is
Υ(si) = QS(si), (196)
while for the numerator, we have
Υ
(
cn(γ), si, s
n\i,m, xn, yn\i, zn\i
)
= µn(γ)Υ
(γ)(si)Υ
(γ)
(
sn\i,m, xn, yn\i, zn\i
∣∣si)
= µn(γ)QS(si)Q
n−1
S
(
sn\i
) 1
Mn
fγ(x
n|m)
×Wn−1
sn\i
(
yn\i
∣∣xn\i)V n−1
sn\i
(
zn\i
∣∣xn\i)
= µn(γ)QS(si)Υ
(γ)
(
sn\i
)
Υ(γ)
(
m
∣∣sn\i)
×Υ(γ)
(
xn
∣∣sn\i,m)Υ(γ)(yn\i, zn\i∣∣sn\i,m, xn)
= Υ(si)Υ
(
cn(γ), s
n\i,m, xn, yn\i, zn\i
)
. (197)
Inserting (196) and (197) back into (195) completes the proof.
B. Lemma 11
Again, fix QS ∈ Q and recall that V = (VT , T ),
where VT = (Y T−1, SnT+1, ZnT+1, Cn). Therefore, we rep-
resent a realization v of V as v = (v˜t, t), where v˜t ,(
yt−1, snt+1, z
n
t+1, cn(γ)
)
∈ Yt−1 × Sn−t × Zn−t × Cn, for
some γ ∈ Γn, and t ∈ [1 : n]. For any (v, u, x, s, y, z) ∈
V × U × X × S × Y × Z , we have
PΥ(S = s|V = v, U = u,X = x)
(a)
= PΥ
(
ST = s
∣∣(VT , T ) = (v˜t, t),M = m,XT = x)
(c)
= PΥ(γ)(St = s)
= QS(s), (198)
where (a) is because U = (M,VT , T ), while (b) uses the
independence of T and (M,Xn, Sn, Y n, Zn) and the inde-
pendence relation from Lemma 10.
By similar steps to those in the derivation of (198), we also
obtain
PΥ(Y = y, Z = z|V = v, U = u,X = x, S = s)
(a)
= PΥ(γ)(Yt = y, Zt = z|Xt = x, St = s)
= Ws(y|x)Vs(z|x), (199)
where (a) also relies on the Markov relation induced by the
channel.
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